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Introduction 
Everywhere in the world, billions of people are suffering from a lack of access to decent 
living conditions. This is ‘understood in terms of what is necessary for them to meet their needs, 
enjoy basic freedom, fair terms of cooperation in collective endeavours, and the social and 
political arrangements that can underwrite these important goods.’ (Brock, 2009a, p. 119) 
Figures show that there is no hope of the situation changing by itself, as inequality worldwide 
keeps increasing. In 2015, the renowned non-governmental organisation Oxfam was already 
calling on world leaders to take action, and wrote in its report:   
 
‘In 2014, the richest 1% of people in the world owned 48% of global wealth, leaving just 52% to be 
shared between the other 99% of adults on the planet. Almost all of that 52% is owned by those included in 
the richest 20%, leaving just 5.5% for the remaining 80% of people in the world. If this trend continues of an 
increasing wealth share to the richest, the top 1% will have more wealth than the remaining 99% of people 
in just two years’ (Hardoon, 2015, p. 2). 
 
Then, in 2018, Oxfam raised the alarm once more, stating in its report that the richest 1% 
of the global population gained 82% of the wealth generated in 2017, which illustrates a 
worsening of the situation (Vazquez Pimentel, Macias Aymar, & Lawson, 2018). Ambitious 
actions must be undertaken. 
 
Development cooperation aims to enhance development in areas of the world were people 
lack access to proper standards of living. These areas are said to be ‘underdeveloped’ or 
‘developing’ which means there are considered disadvantaged compared to ‘industrialised 
states’1. The causes for their disadvantage are often considered to lie in problems of resource 
 
1 Usually, this conceptual division of the world between the ‘developed nations’ and the ‘underdeveloped 
nations’ is based on the per capita GDP: ‘while the countries in the first group have a per capita GDP higher than 
one, calculated by dividing the per capita GDP of the country by the global per capita GDP, the countries in the 
second group will have a per capita GDP lower than one.’ (Chen, 2009, p. 293) Other dichotomies also appear in 
the literature: ‘donor-recipient’, ‘developed/ industrialised-developing’, ‘the West-the Rest’ and ‘the North-the 
South’ – with the donor, the developed, the industrialised, the West and the North referring to the affluent 
countries, whereas the recipient, the developing, the Rest and the South mean the poorer countries. All these terms 
always refer to the same ideas of inequality and disadvantage between nations that is at the basis of development 
cooperation. In this paper, I generally refer to the targeted groups as ‘deprived people’ because their disadvantage 
is reflected in their deprivation of the right and capacity to enjoy decent living conditions. 
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constraints or bad governance. Development cooperation attempts to overcome these problems 
by offering ‘developing states’ technical and financial assistance; supporting their democratic 
institutions; and helping them to strengthen their economies by successfully mobilising their 
available resources and taking better advantage of market opportunities.2 Since every person 
deserves to be as able as other human beings to improve her wellbeing, the fair access to the 
development process and its benefits became the object of the human right to development 
(RTD) proclaimed by the United Nations (UN) in 1986. It is about enabling a person to improve 
her wellbeing by freely and meaningfully participating to and benefiting from human 
development. In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action recognised the RTD 
as a universal human right. Unfortunately, billions of people remain unable to enjoy this right 
by lack of access to basic goods and freedoms, while some others have the capacity to assist 
them. Most notably, ‘affluent states’ could achieve much more through development 
cooperation. But it faces problems preventing it to meet its purpose of fostering global 
development. The main objective of this paper is to argue that the RTD implies a duty of 
international solidarity3 that should generally fall on ‘affluent states’. It is an important topic 
because a duty of international solidarity based on the RTD could help development 
cooperation to better serve its purpose. The billions of deprived people would finally be able to 
enjoy their RTD and improve their wellbeing. 
 
My inquiry proceeds as follows. It is shown in the first chapter that the duty of solidarity is 
a collective duty for which particular agents around the world must do their fair share because 
the deprivation of billions of people is a global issue that must be tackled through cooperation 
at domestic and global levels. States – especially affluent ones – are such agents who can form 
 
2 In the non-profit sector, people usually prefer to refer to international solidarity rather than development 
cooperation, because the word development may be linked to notions of domination, imperialism and exploitation. 
This is notably because development cooperation can be sourced to the Covenant of the League of Nations after 
World War I that first introduced the idea of ‘development stages’, ‘thereby justifying a classification system 
according to which there were ‘developed’ nations at the top of the ladder’ while other nations were 
‘underdeveloped’, i.e. ‘economically backward’ areas (Rist, 1997, pp. 61, 72). For more on this, confer post-
development theories. Since development has remained the most dominant word within international relations and 
international law, it is convenient to continue using it and related terms throughout this paper. 
3 I chose to borrow Scheyven’s expression because it reflects well the essence of the duty corresponding to 
the RTD, and because I wanted to distinct the duty of solidarity from other duties like the duty to protect (for 
instance defended by D. Miller (2009) in regard to basic human rights) or the duty to aid (presented by V. Igneski 
(2017) concerning the right to subsistence). In other words, I wanted an expression that could almost only be 
attributed to the context of the RTD. 
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a collective agent very capable of bearing the duty. To perform their duty, they should use a 
common international institution such as the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development). In theory, states cooperate to foster development and the OECD coordinates 
indeed a large part of development cooperation. In practice however, current development 
cooperation faces issues preventing it to be the kind of cooperation necessary to perform the 
duty of international solidarity.  
This concern is the object of the second chapter. The development process appears to often 
be instrumentalised to serve other purposes than improving the lot of humankind. This plays a 
role in the financing gap of development. There are also misuses and inappropriate solutions 
due to the lack of transparency and accountability, and to the patronising attitude of ‘affluent 
states’. These problems have aroused a large range of criticisms against aid in the literature 
because they have led to ineffectiveness and have even done harm. Aid is therefore not 
perceived as a suitable means to improve the situation of the destitute. The second chapter 
largely draws on the work of William Easterly (Easterly, 2006) who, in his famous book The 
White Man’s Burden, claims that evidence over the past sixty years provides very little support 
for the general belief that development aid is needed for poor countries to escape poverty. It 
shows on the contrary that ‘poorest countries can grow and develop on their own’, that 
economic stagnation is rather due to awful governments, and that, according to statistics, 
‘countries with high aid are no more likely to take off than are those with low aid’ (Easterly, 
2006, pp. 40, 43, 51). According to him, aid faces too many intrinsic problems and does more 
harm than good. In the face of so much problems, it is time to reshape development cooperation 
and reconnect it with its moral purpose.  
The third chapter explores the human rights-based approach (HRBA) to development – i.e. 
methods focused on the realisation of human rights throughout the development process – as a 
solution to problems of development cooperation and a means to realise the duty of solidarity. 
Based on human rights principles, the HRBA provides guidance on the way human 
development should be pursued. In fact, such approach is called for in the RTD Declaration 
since it demands the respect of human rights principles and aims at the full realisation of human 
rights throughout all phases of the development process. This paper finishes on a simple 
proposal for inclusive public participation to empower deprived people to take an active role in 
the development process.   
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Chapter 1. States’ duty of international solidarity 
In  1986 the UN proclaimed the human right to development (RTD) as ‘an inalienable 
human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate 
in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised.’ (United Nations, 1986, art. 1) 
The declaration presses UN members to increase their efforts and cooperation to remove the 
obstacles to development. Since the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the 
RTD is legally recognised as a universal human right. Considering that the notion of 
development is broad and complex, the RTD ‘does not respond to and cannot be attributed a 
harmonised or universally-acceptable definition.’ (Ngang, Kamga, & Gumede, 2018, p. 2) 
Nevertheless, the Declaration on the RTD provides basic elements enabling us to understand 
what the recognition of such human right should entail. Like any other human right, the RTD 
implies a duty to respect it for all humankind. No one can pretend to have the right to deprive 
someone of her human rights. Then, the RTD is also linked to a duty to aid one’s fellow man 
deprived of his RTD. The more an agent is capable to help people to enjoy their RTD, the more 
responsible she is to contribute to its realisation. In many cases, it will turn out that a collective 
agent will be more capable than an individual. To avoid confusion, I choose to call ‘the duty to 
aid’ a ‘duty of solidarity’ when it is borne by a collective agent instead of an individual. This 
chapter takes an interest in states as collective agents and argues that they bear a duty of 
international solidarity towards any person deprived of her RTD because they are powerful 
agents whose contributions are necessary for the RTD to become a reality, firstly within their 
own borders, then at the global level. This chapter also explains that additional considerations 
to the capacity principle should come to use when assigning the duty. 
I. The human right to development 
‘Human rights are defined as values of human dignity that aim to protect and advance the 
liberty, equality and wellbeing of individuals and/or groups of people.’ (FAO, 2017, p. 6) It is 
their purpose to secure minimum basic life conditions so that a person can make herself 
respected and have a decent life that she values. This is ‘understood in terms of what is 
necessary for [a person] to meet [her] needs, enjoy basic freedom, fair terms of cooperation in 
collective endeavours, and the social and political arrangements that can underwrite these 
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important goods.’ (Brock, 2009a, p. 119) Access to development is crucial for human 
wellbeing. It is a process enabling a person to continually improve her living standards 
(economic, social, cultural and political) actively, freely and meaningfully, so she can at the 
very least live in conditions where her human dignity is not jeopardised, i.e. where her inherent 
value as a human being is respected. Such conditions require the respect of all human rights. 
Aware of this necessity, the UN proclaimed in 1986 the Right to Development (RTD). In the 
Declaration, development is described as ‘a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and 
political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire 
population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation 
in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom’ (United Nations, 
1986). The development process should entail measures aiming to ‘ensure, inter alia, equality 
of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, 
housing, employment and the fair distribution of income.’ (art. 8, 1986) The idea behind the 
RTD is that all human beings are entitled to benefit from this comprehensive development 
process so they can rightfully live with dignity in a social and international order in which all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in human rights official instruments can be 
fully realised (such as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights).4 
Consequently, the RTD expresses a comprehensive and holistic vision of development 
according to which the improvement of human wellbeing requires the respect of human dignity, 
which necessitates the realisation of all human rights (civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural) into an indivisible and interdependent set to be enjoyed by all human beings (Sengupta, 
1999, para. 11). And inversely, the realisation of all human rights demands free and equal access 
to the development process, because if they are not given the right and means to improve their 
wellbeing, people cannot secure respect for their dignity. The RTD is the expression of this 
interdependence between the idea of development and human dignity. Both are necessary for 
the realisation of one another, thus for the constant improvement of human wellbeing and for 
the universal realisation of all human rights. In this sense, Bernard Raymond Guimbo considers 
 
4 Note that the RTD differs from the right to subsistence which merely gives right to the most basic human 
needs, whereas the RTD defends the idea that every human being is entitled to be able to constantly improve his 
wellbeing through the enjoyment of all human rights. 
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that the RTD is consubstantial to human dignity; its denial would condemn the claim that all 
humans are equal. Claiming that all human beings have equal worth only has meaning if we 
acknowledge that they should have equal opportunities and means to continually improve their 
life conditions, i.e. a right to development (Guimbo, 1997, p. 79). To be sure, the RTD only 
looks at human rights holistically, never separately. Therefore, if any human right is violated, 
the set is incomplete and the RTD is not achieved. In other words, the level of realisation of this 
right is contingent on the level of realisation of other human rights. When a person enjoys life 
conditions in which all her rights are realised and dignity respected, she keeps her right to 
constantly improve her wellbeing if she is not satisfied with her situation. To respect her dignity 
requires to respect her right to fulfil herself within the respect of other persons’ rights and 
freedoms. The development process should not be instrumentalised and serve another purpose 
than improving the lot of humankind, and it should never jeopardise a person’s dignity, rights 
and freedoms. 
II. The general duty to aid 
Like any right, the RTD is composed of both entitlements and duties; it involves right 
holders who are entitled to enjoy development and duty bearers who are obligated to realise the 
RTD. As explained above, realising the RTD requires proper living conditions. So, duty bearers 
have the duty to respect these conditions (meaning not worsening them) and the duty to aid the 
people deprived of them. Since the RTD is a human right, the right holders are every living 
human being. Duty bearers, on the other hand, are more difficult to identify. Both duties are 
general moral duties, i.e. a ‘duties we have toward all humanity universally’ (Parrish, 2009, p. 
123). They indicate broad moral goals that require positive steps (Buchanan, 1996, p. 29). 
Unlike special moral duties that can easily be assigned to specific persons due to special 
connection to right holders, general duties can be claimed against anyone. In the case of the 
duty not to harm (or the duty not to worsen others’ living conditions), this does not cause a 
problem because it is a perfect duty; it is clear what can be claimed by right holders (everyone 
has the right not to be harmed), and what is owed by duty bearers (everyone has the duty not to 
harm others) (Igneski, 2017, p. 35). Or in Allen Buchanan’s words: ‘Perfect duties are 
determinate, both with regard to the content of what is required (what one is obligated to do) 
and with regard to the identity of the object of the duty (the individual or individuals to whom 
or for whom one is to do something).’ (1996, p. 28) It is different in the case of the duty to aid, 
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for it is an imperfect duty; it faces an important ‘degree of indeterminacy’, meaning it does not 
impose a specific request on duty bearers, only that they commit to certain ends (Igneski, 2017, 
p. 36). It demands of everyone a commitment to aiding people deprived of conditions enabling 
them to improve their wellbeing, but duty bearers are free to decide how and when to fulfil their 
commitment, and free to decide who to help. ‘What is important is that we do something, 
sometime (…). We need not do this particular thing, for this particular individual, today.’ (1996, 
pp. 30–31) Everyone has the responsibility to do something: ‘it would be morally wrong – a 
denial of equal human worth – simply to stand by and do nothing.’ (Miller, 2009, p. 233, 
footnote)  
Due to its inherent flexibility, an imperfect duty faces problems of lack of coordination, 
moral laxity and allocation. The first is due to the fact that moral agents tend to act 
independently and weigh their efforts ‘according to their own judgement and preferences’ as to 
how to perform their duty (1996, p. 32). This generally leads to a problem of moral laxity, 
meaning that agents contribute less or not at all to their imperfect moral duty. Finally, right 
holders can hardly identify particular duty bearers against which they can claim their RTD, that 
is the duty allocation problem. As David Miller has pointed regarding the duty to protect basic 
human rights, ‘It is one thing to say that when large-scale violations of human rights are taking 
place, there is a diffused responsibility on the part of humanity as a whole to protect the victims; 
it is another to say more precisely where this responsibility falls and how it can be made 
effective.’ (Miller, 2009, p. 235) So, against whom should a person in need claim assistance if 
we are all responsible? How should the duty to aid be assigned? While the first two problems 
can be solved through schemes of cooperation, the lack of straightforward answer to the 
identification gap may lead some people to question the meaningfulness of the RTD. Rather 
than giving up on the RTD, we should figure out a scheme enabling us to identify specific moral 
agents in each case who bear more responsibility than others.  
III. Principles to assign the duty 
There are various criteria based on which the general duty to aid can be assigned to certain 
agents due to their particular connection to right holders. Like Violetta Igneski (Igneski, 2017), 
we can find inspiration in David Miller’s principles to allocate remedial responsibility. ‘To be 
remedially responsible for a bad situation means to have a special obligation to put the bad 
situation right, in other words to be picked out, either individually or along with others, as 
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having a responsibility towards the deprived or suffering party that is not shared equally among 
all agents.’ (Miller, 2001, p. 454) In the case of the duty to aid, we can say that the bad situation 
is the lack of proper living conditions to enjoy the RTD. Even if everyone is responsible to 
improve the situation, there are duty bearers who are especially remedially responsible towards 
particular right holders due to their special responsibilities. The assignment of such special 
responsibilities operates under a set of principles.  
i. Backward-looking principles 
Miller discusses such principles who could imply special responsibilities between right 
holders and moral agents. There are two kinds: the backward-looking and the forward-looking 
principles. Backward-looking principles care about the past, whereas forward-looking 
principles use considerations about the future. It is not enough to search in the past for the 
causally responsible agent, because we are unlikely to hold her remedially responsible in cases 
where her actions were justified and inevitable, or unintentional (Miller, 2001, p. 459). With 
this in mind, Miller explains that principles to assign remedial responsibility must examine 
agents’ conduct and ‘how far their behaviour was justified.’ (2001, p. 457) Thus, backward-
looking principles assign responsibility to agents who can be blamed for having caused or 
permitted a wrong state of affairs to exist or continue due to ‘negligence, strict liability, or some 
similar criterion.’ (Parrish, 2009, p. 122) Miller distinguishes two principles: moral 
responsibility and outcome responsibility. An agent is morally responsible to remedy the 
deprivation of some people if she has failed her moral duty to provide for them. The agent is 
thus ‘liable to moral blame.’ (2001, p. 456) She is outcome responsible if she did something – 
although morally justified – that caused the deprivation of these people and for which it is 
reasonable to demand reparation from her (unlike a causally responsible agent). In this case, 
the agent has ‘done nothing that attracts moral praise or blame’ but still owes reparation 
(ibidem). Sometimes, there is no moral responsible nor outcome responsible. Therefore, Miller 
evokes that remedial responsibility can also be assigned to agents who have benefited from the 
harmful situation. This is the benefit principle. 
ii. Forward-looking principles 
These three backward-looking principles are often useful to assign remedial responsibility, 
and they reflect most people’s moral intuitions that it is the agent(s) who played a role in the 
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harmful situation who must remedy it. However, because they look exclusively in the past, 
these principles cannot always serve the duty to aid, for instance when the agent ‘proves to be 
incapable of discharging her remedial responsibilities’ (Miller, 2001, p. 460). For this reason, 
considerations about the future also matter when assigning responsibility. In Miller’s work, this 
is assured by the capacity principle. It appoints responsible agents by assessing who will best 
achieve the goal of carrying a certain state of affairs. The idea is that ‘If we want bad situations 
put right, we should give the responsibility to those who are best placed to do the remedying.’ 
(2001, pp. 460–461) In the case of the duty to aid, the expected state of affairs is the 
amelioration of people’s living conditions so they can enjoy their RTD. To identify the most 
capable agent(s), both factors of effectiveness and cost must be considered (2001, p. 461). The 
weakness of this principle is that it assigns ‘no intrinsic weight to the value we attach to moral 
responsibility’ and historical considerations (2001, pp. 461, 466).  
Additionally, another principle proposed by Miller is the communitarian principle. It 
states that: an agent may be held remedial responsible if she has a special relationship with the 
deprived people due to communal ties (‘such as those that exist within families, collegial groups 
of various kinds, nations, (…) common activities and commitments, common identities, 
common histories, or other such sources’) (2001, p. 462). One might ask whether it is relevant 
to use the idea of special responsibilities to assign a general duty. As demonstrated by Simon 
Caney, it is possible for a humanity-centred approach that assigns the duty to every individual 
‘independently of person’s membership of a common association, [to] capture the ways in 
which associations have moral relevance for distributive justice.’ (Caney, 2011, pp. 526, 529) 
According to his ‘variability thesis’, it is not the humanity-centred distributive principle (i.e. 
the assignment of the duty to every human being) that varies, but what he calls the ‘substantive 
implications’ of the principle. The latter are affected by the extent of integration of the duty 
bearer in associations. In other words, it is coherent to claim that all individuals are duty bearers 
regardless of their relations to right holders, but also claim that what the duty requires of them 
will vary according to these relations. Caney exposes this idea in the ‘special responsibility 
thesis’: ‘a persons’ moral responsibilities may be a function of their membership of 
associations’ because, in addition to having general responsibilities to all, ‘some have special 
responsibilities to ensure that some specific others to whom they are related enjoy their 
legitimate entitlements’ (2011, p. 529). While everyone must care that every person be able to 
enjoy her RTD (entitling her to good prospects in life), some may owe them more than others 
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by virtue of their special responsibilities towards them. Anyway, the communitarian principle 
cannot be used alone since it needs considerations from another principle to say how the burden 
must be shared ‘within the community’, for instance by means of the capacity principle (2001, 
p. 463). 
iii. Applying the principles 
Determining relevant principles is the first step to assign special responsibilities. 
Elaborating a strategy to apply the principles is the second. Instead of arbitrarily choose one 
superior principle over the others, or use the principles in strict sequence, Miller explains that 
the strategy ‘should be more openly pluralist’ and flexible according to each situation (Miller, 
2001, p. 467). In his connection theory, he explains that the principles specify various forms of 
connection between agents and victims (2001, p. 469). Each of the principles identified above 
may have a role to play depending on each case. The moral responsibility principle may be 
more conclusive than another principle to appoint a duty bearer, while the communitarian 
principle may do better in another case. Miller adds that when several principles may apply and 
point at different remedially responsible agents, ‘we should weigh their respective strengths.’ 
(2001, p. 467) The responsibility should fall on the agent(s) whose connection to the victim is 
the strongest. And if the responsibility is heavy, it should be divided up ‘according to relative 
strength of connection.’ (2001, p. 469) Miller acknowledges that weighing multiple criteria this 
way may be complex and can only be assessed through shared moral intuitions (2001, p. 471). 
Yet, he argues that real-world cases are complex, and that this strategy at least ensures that there 
is always some agent to appoint as remedially responsible. Besides, it makes room for ‘the 
deeply held belief’ that where we can blame a particular agent as being morally or causally 
responsible for the deprivation of a person, it is the former who should bear the burden of 
helping the latter, wherever possible (Hjorthen, 2017, p. 399; 2001, p. 471).  
iv. The primacy of the capacity principle 
While agreeing with Miller that various factors must enter in consideration, I believe like 
Frederik Hjorthen that, when using the principles to assign a duty, the capacity principle should 
never be overlooked because it would not serve right holders to assign the duty to an agent who 
is not able to face it (Hjorthen, 2017, p. 400). Consequently, other principles should rather play 
the role of ‘tie-breakers’, meaning they should help determining the most responsible duty 
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bearer among all equally capable agents5. In line with Miller’s strategy, Hjorthen says that the 
relative weights of the other factors ‘should be determined case-by-case.’ (Hjorthen, 2017, pp. 
402, 403) In most cases, it can be expected that effectiveness would not outweigh the 
importance of causal and moral responsibilities, due to the (already mentioned) belief that these 
imply stronger connections for remedial responsibility. So, even if an agent (who is neither 
causally nor morally responsible) has the ability to offer assistance more effectively to some 
deprived people (than the causally or morally responsible agents), the duty to aid would surely 
fall upon the causally or morally responsible agents if they are known and capable. If they are 
unable to meet the duty to aid, the causally or morally responsible agents should not be 
appointed duty bearers, but this does not mean that they should not be held accountable for the 
wrong situation caused by their actions and that they do not owe something to their victims. 
IV. The collective duty of solidarity 
Violetta Igneski advances that Miller’s strategy to assign the duty is useful but requires 
additional considerations in order to always avoid the duty allocation problem. There remain 
cases where relying on the principles does not suffice. For example, when a natural disaster 
occurs, the capacity principle says that all agents capable to help the victims should do their 
best, but none of the millions of potential duty bearers with the capacity to help them is more 
responsible than the others. The other principles might not enable the victims to assign the duty 
to aid them to particular agents. They will unlikely find an agent to blame for having failed 
them, nor someone who benefits from their plight. When they cannot seek help in their 
community, to whom should they turn for aid? Even if we take additional factors into 
consideration such as the effectiveness or sustainability of the assistance that capable agents 
can provide, there remains several potential duty bearers with the same level of remedial 
responsibility. One of them would do good by helping the victims, but he would not be wrong 
not to help these particular persons, since, as we saw, the duty to aid is an imperfect duty. He 
would only be wrong were he helping no one because he would then be denying his duty to aid 
while being capable to fulfil it. Individuals on their own are not duty bearers towards all 
 
5 Agents are equally able if they are all capable of meeting the duty, even if one of them has more capacity 
(for instance in terms of means or knowledge). Hjorthen calls this a functional tie (Hjorthen, 2017, p. 403). 
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deprived people, because they are not capable of helping them alone. An individual might be 
able to provide aid to a person in need so she can reach a decent level of wellbeing, but this 
would not discharge him from his duty to aid since there would remain billions of others to help 
(Igneski, 2017, p. 38). This leaves our needy person without ways to know against whom claim 
assistance. Billions of people are in need of assistance because they cannot enjoy their RTD, 
against which capable agents should they demand it?  
 
In order to fix this problem of duty allocation, Igneski makes an interesting proposal. She 
argues that the duty to aid should be borne by a collective and should thus be regarded as a 
collective perfect duty in response to a collective problem. For her, we must look at the fact that 
billions of people lack the means and conditions to live with dignity as a collective global issue, 
because remedying their deprivation will require cooperation between individuals, institutions 
and other non-state actors at domestic and global levels. Consequently, the duty to aid can be 
seen as a collective duty. She writes: ‘Rather than viewing the duty to aid as an individual 
imperfect duty to aid that can be aggregated with everyone else’s individual duties to aid – so 
that the collective duty is simply an aggregation of individual duties – we have good reason to 
conceive of the duty, in the first instance, as a collective duty arising in response to a collective 
problem.’ (Igneski, 2017, p. 44) Based on Miller’s principle of capacity, Igneski says that, if 
agents are capable together, then they can constitute together a collective duty bearer, i.e. the 
group of agents who form together one moral agent responsible for the realisation of the duty 
to aid. Since an individual could never accomplish such task alone, the duty cannot be assigned 
to an individual alone. However, if he is capable of contributing to a collective action that could 
realise the task, then he has the duty to do it and thus be part of the collective agent. To avoid 
confusion, we should call the collective duty ‘the duty of solidarity’ and understand the duty to 
aid has individual agents’ duty to contribute to the collective duty. This solves the issue of it 
being an imperfect duty without ‘counterpart rights’, for it can now be seen as a duty of justice 
from which people have the individual duty to do their part.  
Now there remains to find how to constitute such collective agents to which every capable 
agent contributes. Inspired by Robert Goodin’s institutional approach to creating collective 
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institutions to perfect individual imperfect duties6, Igneski suggests that the collective agent 
should create or use a collective institution that could realise its collective duty. Because it is 
the purpose of such institution, it is its perfect duty to honour the collective duty. To realise its 
perfect duty, an institution of this kind enjoins its members to do a particular act. To do this act 
is their perfect institutional duty. And it is their moral duty to respect their institutional duty 
(ibid. p. 40). It is only once the collective agent has decided how to fulfil its duty of solidarity 
that its members will be able to determine what their individual contributions should be. Then, 
each one of them is responsible for his contribution and shares responsibility with the others 
for the collective duty. Taxes are a good example of Goodin’s approach. When used to assist 
the needy, the system of taxation contributes to fulfil its contributors’ moral duty to aid. And 
by paying their taxes, contributors do what they can to aid others through a legitimate institution 
discharging their duty to aid adequately. If no appropriate institution exists, people should 
create it or find another way to discharge their duty. Instead of creating a collective agent out 
of a group of agents who do not have an intentional structure to coordinate their collective duty 
– for instance as suggested by Igneski, a group constituted of all affluent individuals, we can 
attempt to find a group that already associates all capable agents. Based on the arguments 
developed earlier in this chapter, I explain in the following sections why states are such agents 
bearing the duty of solidarity towards people who cannot exercise their RTD. 
V. The state as a duty bearer 
So long as they have the capacity to bear the duty to aid, all kinds of agents can be identified 
as duty bearers. However, this section and the one following aim to show that we can expect 
the duty to fall upon states. A lot can be done by aid agencies and volunteer groups, but we 
cannot restrict international rights protection to such agents for they would face obvious 
limitations. For instance, ‘no voluntary body is likely to have the capacity to stand up to the 
delinquent state’ (Miller, 2009, p. 237). Also, a voluntary body is not democratically 
accountable, at least not to the same extent as a state may be ‘to their own citizens and to 
 
6 The idea of perfecting an imperfect duty was theorised earlier by Allen Buchanan. It means creating a 
situation in which moral laxity is less likely to occur by assigning ‘specific obligations to the cooperating parties 
so as to achieve a moral division of labour that will reach the targets, and provide adequate incentives for 
compliance with the specified obligations.’ (Buchanan, 1996, p. 40) 
17 
 
international bodies.’ (ibidem) Considering the kind of cooperation required to realise the RTD, 
actions will always require the implication of states. Besides, states have the power to make 
other kinds of actors contribute as well. For instance, a government can decide to increase 
taxation on wealthy individuals and companies and use the gained amount to fund its solidarity 
programmes. So, imputing the duty of solidarity on states does not free other capable agents 
from their duty to aid by supporting states’ duty. 
 
Given the important means at its disposal, we can assume that a state is capable of fostering 
the RTD of its members. Surely, the citizens who do not enjoy their RTD could turn to various 
kinds of agents (wealthy individuals, collective organisations, businesses, non-profit-making 
organisations, foreign states, etc.) to demand aid, but if we apply the strategy detailed in section 
III above, their own state should be one of the first capable agents against which citizens should 
claim assistance. To be sure, if it is capable of helping them, a state should be among duty 
bearers towards foreign citizens as well – as discussed in the following section, but it owes 
more to its citizens who cannot enjoy their RTD. This claim can be supported by at least two 
reasons. First, if we combine Miller’s communitarian principle and Igneski’s idea of a collective 
duty, a state can be seen as the collective agent that realises its citizens’ duty to aid. Second, it 
is a state’s moral responsibility towards its own citizens to ensure their enjoyment of the RTD. 
i. The state as a collective agent  
As we saw, the communitarian principle states that communal ties may lead to special 
responsibilities. We may adopt a human-centred approach that assigns the duty to aid to every 
individual towards the entirety of humankind, and at the same time acknowledge the relevance 
of special relationships. The common membership to a state is arguably such special 
relationship, for citizens of a state are associated to one another through special rights and 
duties. This line of thoughts relates to the social contract tradition in political philosophy about 
the relationship between citizens and their states. According to this thinking, the state is the 
result of individuals associating to protect and realise their rights through the provision of ‘such 
goods as protection from harm, rule enforcement, and (…) key public goods’ (Parrish, 2009, p. 
131). For this purpose, it is authorised to use its powers and act on the behalf of its citizens, and 
the latter give it the means to do so, for example through taxation (2009, p. 129). If fellow-
citizens all have the duty to aid each other, they should decide to collectivise the duty, so they 
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can prevent the problem of duty allocation, as argued by Igneski. Like we saw earlier, the duty 
to aid is imperfect and collectivising it would solve its problem of allocation due to its 
indeterminacy. Considering that ‘The state is a peculiar form of social connection’ that 
‘represents its citizens’ interests and purposes’ (2009, pp. 133, 134), citizens should be able to 
discharge their duty to aid towards each other via the agency of their state. In other words, states 
can ‘be seen as proxies for the duty-bearing individuals from whom they are made up’ 
(Hjorthen, 2017, p. 392). Besides, the state also has a particular authoritative status over its 
members that enables it to ensure and coordinate their fair contributions and thus better prevent 
problems of coordination and moral laxity when it comes to performing the duty to aid. 
Consequently, the state appears to be one of the most capable agents to bear the duty to ensure 
the enjoyment of the RTD for all its members, and the latter must do their fair share to contribute 
to the realisation of the duty of solidarity according to their capacity.  
ii. The state’s moral responsibility 
Since the state is the result of individuals associating to protect and realise their rights, 
protecting the human rights of its own citizens is one of the pillars of its claim to sovereignty; 
it is ‘one of its primary functions and (arguably) a condition of its legitimacy.’ (Miller, 2009, 
p. 232) Therefore, it is its moral duty to secure their RTD. If some of its citizens do not enjoy 
their RTD, the state is failing them and is thus morally responsible to remedy their deprivation. 
If the state is incapable or refuses to meet its duty, then the duty should be assigned to other 
agents.  
 
The other principles may also appoint the duty to aid to a state. Sometimes, citizens’ 
deprivation is the result of bad domestic policies, and in such cases their state is also causally 
or even outcome responsible, in addition to being morally responsible. If the principles point at 
various kinds of agents (besides the state), decision must be made as to which principle must 
be given more weight. In any case, the state keeps its share of responsibility. For instance, a 
multinational firm or a guerrilla unit could be outcome responsible agents, while the deprivation 
of the citizens could benefit another agent. Then, moral judgment is required to fairly share the 
responsibility between these agents. The state may be asked a smaller contribution, even if it 
can offer more. 
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VI. International solidarity 
When they cannot receive the aid that they need from their fellow-citizens and their state, 
deprived citizens may find other agents against which they can claim assistance. Among other 
possible responsible agents, there are capable foreign states. First, because as collective agents, 
states must perform their citizens’ duty to aid foreign citizens – not just their fellow-citizens – 
when they have the capacity to aid outside their borders. Second, because enhancing 
development worldwide is the kind of goal that requires coordinated international collective 
action. Otherwise, each state will likely be quick to neglect its duty of solidarity for reasons 
such as ‘too burdensome’, lack of capacity, lack of ‘relevant connection to the plight of the 
victims’, ‘legitimate claim to its own resources’, distributive unfairness, etc. (Hjorthen, 2017, 
p. 326) Besides, when joining their forces, states constitute a collective agent that can become 
the most capable agent to bear the duty of solidarity. 
i. Aiding foreigners 
Since the duty to aid is universal, it also concerns individuals with whom the duty bearers 
have no communal ties. Just like citizens should use their state to discharge their collective duty 
of solidarity that they owe to their compatriots, they should rely on their state to perform their 
duty towards foreign human beings. A state has thus the duty of solidarity primarily towards its 
members, then – when it is capable – towards deprived foreigners. If a state can help its 
members, but lacks the means to aid abroad, then it only bears the duty of solidarity towards its 
own citizens. 
ii. An international collective agent 
Here again, there may be problems of duty allocation and of moral laxity, a lack of fair 
burden sharing and of cooperation between capable duty bearers. It remains difficult for 
deprived populations to know against which foreign state they should claim assistance, and for 
capable states to know who they ought to help and to what extent. This identification gap 
provides ground for states to undermine their duty of solidarity, especially if they see the costs 
they are asked to bear as being too great, either absolutely or in comparison to those being borne 
by others (Miller, 2009, p. 247). Just like Buchanan has pointed out about individual businesses, 
states ‘may be quite willing to contribute to a worthy social goal, but only on condition that 
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others (again, especially their competitors) will make a fair contribution as well.’ (Buchanan, 
1996, p. 33) And because the duty is imperfect, determining the fair share requires coordination 
and a common agreement among duty bearers. Also, having states working alone may be 
counterproductive if they do not coordinate their efforts. Therefore, such common agreement 
should specify the content, object, and timing of each state’s contributions. Following Igneski’s 
line of thoughts, it seems that to honour its duty to aid the billions of deprived people, a state’s 
best option is to contribute to collective actions designed to reach all deprived people 
worldwide. Consequently, capable states should form a collective agent together and use a 
common international institution to realise the duty of solidarity. The OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) appears to be such institution gathering capable 
states. It should ‘work out a system of burden-sharing’ so that the costs of assistance can be 
evenly spread (Miller, 2009, p. 249). For this, the principles discussed throughout this chapter 
come again to use, for the burden should not merely be shouldered by the most capable state. 
For each situation, the system should enable the OECD to identify the most responsible states 
among its members, according to the principles. ‘Having more states share in the burden of 
[assistance] will lower the costs each state faces’ and will enable to distribute the burden more 
fairly (Hjorthen, 2017, p. 404). Of course, as stressed by Hjorthen, effectiveness will require to 
limit the number of duty bearers in each case up to a certain extent (2017, p. 405). Effectiveness 
may also take other factors in consideration, such as geographical proximity, cultural similarity, 
expertise or resources. Also, previous altercations between a state and a foreign population may 
have created resentment which may hinder the capacity of a state to collaborate with local 
people (2017, p. 400). On the other hand, a state’s history or special connections with deprived 
citizens can be a reason to ask a larger contribution from it to the system, even when it can bear 
the costs less easily than another state. 
Here is an example of how the scheme could work in the case of coordinated assistance 
offered to Angolan citizens: first, we must assess with the citizens the extent of assistance 
needed through inclusive public participation (as discussed in the last section of this paper). 
Then, we must assign responsibility scores to states to determine which ones should be part of 
the coalition that will cooperate with Angola. The higher responsibility score a state has, the 
more reasons it has to be part of the coalition. Each responsible state will have to communicate 
on its highest amount of burden it is capable to bear (while acknowledging its other 
responsibilities towards other populations). The amounts will be added together from the one 
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of the most responsible state to the less, until the total amount reaches the extent of assistance 
needed that was determined earlier. This way of proceeding enables to identify the fairest and 
smallest burden-sharing coalition possible capable of helping Angolan citizens. 
a. Outcome responsibility 
In order to divide the burden among OECD members and determine the smallest burden-
sharing coalition case by case, we should assess states’ outcome responsibility. As pointed by 
Hjorthen: ‘While establishing with the sufficient clarity whether and to what extent outside 
states are relevantly linked to the occurrence of violence may sometimes be difficult, there are 
presumably cases where we can say, with sufficient certainty, that some states are more 
responsible than others.’ (Hjorthen, 2017, p. 399) A capable state who adopted imperialist 
attitudes in the past over a foreign state owe the latter assistance if it now lacks the means to 
enable its population to enjoy the RTD. Had the former state not unfairly accumulated wealth 
at the expense of the latter, the deprived population would be better off. Another argument can 
be elaborated on the ground of ‘the polluter pays principle’. Global warming and pollution (in 
the air, the soil and water) have disastrous environmental consequences inflicting a great burden 
on populations having to deal with biodiversity losses, droughts, water scarcity, the depletion 
of natural resources, floods, typhoons, etc. Such environmental consequences result notably 
from large polluting industrial activities. States taking part in such activities (directly or not) 
have the remedial responsibility to help the victims to bear this unfair burden that prevents them 
to enjoy decent living conditions. 
States may also bear an outcome responsibility for ongoing externalities of economic or 
political decisions that are not in themselves unjust (for instance suddenly stopping trading with 
that nation) but that have unjust consequences because they severely jeopardise people’s ability 
to enjoy the RTD. States mutually rely on common markets (in goods, services, or capital), 
populations thus sometimes end up in unwanted situations resulting from the choices of others. 
If another country makes economic or political decisions that threaten foreigners’ RTD, the 
latter is entitled to assistance from the country to protect its RTD (D. Miller, 2004, p. 138). 
Because a state acts as its citizens’ representative and the latter give it the means for it, the 
state’s actions are bond to their collective responsibility. This implies, as argued earlier, that 
citizens can use their state to perform their collective duty. It also means that citizens must bear 
a collective responsibility for their state’s actions, since they contribute to these by empowering 
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their state. If such actions cause harm to others (even indirectly), it is part of their collective 
responsibility to contribute to actions (from their state or another agent) that will remedy the 
harm and answer the deprived citizens’ plight. Parrish explains that citizens especially bear 
such collective responsibility in a democratic state where they can ‘witness and judge their 
state’s actions through a public process that is reasonably fair and open’ (2009, p. 130). 
Citizen’s collective responsibility is diminished – yet always exists – if they have a limited 
voice within their community or are manipulated (2009, pp. 143, 145). 
b. The benefit principle 
If it can be established that a state has benefited from the deprivation of a population, the 
state should aid the latter as a matter of compensation. Some authors like Thomas Pogge argue 
that ‘affluent states’ benefit from an unfair global order dependent on the deprivation of others. 
The international economic system consisting of treaties, conventions, investments, loans, 
patents, copyrights, taxation, etc., has seriously affected the capacity of disadvantaged states to 
emerge from poverty. The rules of the global economic order result from negotiations led by 
the ‘affluent states’ where they take advantage of the low bargaining power of the 
disadvantaged states. In its 2016 Human Development Report, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) denounces the decisive advantages of some groups ‘in defining both the 
rules of the game and the payoffs’, which compromise the fairness of the system (UNDP, 2016, 
p. 137). Governments are expected to represent the interests of their populations in international 
negotiations, but they should not be able to ‘impose global rules under which [they] have unfair 
advantages that add millions of poverty deaths in the developing world.’ (ibid. 2004, p. 276) 
Yet that is what seems to happen in the global order. To quote Mohan Rao: ‘Political negotiation 
in the present set-up is fragmented across various international agencies and forums with highly 
uneven representation.’ (Mohan Rao, 1999, p. 589) Consequently, international rules of the 
game of international cooperation are obviously decided by the powerful players. One might 
even argue that in the global context the poor are powerless (ibid. 1999, pp. 586, 589). 
Desperately in need of economic development, disadvantaged states agree to trade on terms 
that are not always in their best interest. Consequently, ‘affluent states’ get what they need 
while still being able to maintain heavy protection of their markets (‘through tariffs, quotas, 
anti-dumping duties and subsidies to domestic producers’), which leads the disadvantaged 
countries to miss out on export revenues, among other things. Additionally, Gillian Brock 
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underlines that schemes such as the policy of ‘transfer pricing’ or regimes of financial secrecy 
lead ‘developing countries [to] lose revenue far greater than the annual flow of aid. […] In 
many cases, the revenue that would be derived simply from resource sales, if received and 
properly spent, would be more than enough to finance the necessary provisions for helping 
people to meet their needs.’ (Brock, 2009, pp. 125, 127) Were the rules fair, the disadvantaged 
states would benefit much more from their participation in the global market and equitably 
share the potential burden with other states. 
Thomas Pogge also advances that certain states benefit from the deprivation of 
disadvantaged populations since they take advantage of corruption and oppression maintaining 
such deprivation. And for Pogge, the prevalence of these problems is in itself a cause of the 
unfairness world order (Pogge, 2004, p. 268). Many of those corrupt self-interested 
governments came to power and stay in power only thanks to the West supporting them, 
recognising them officially and trading with them. Poor but resource-rich countries are not poor 
because their populations have elected bad governments, but because the global order is such 
that ‘any group controlling a preponderance of the means of coercion’ within a ‘poor country’ 
can easily and freely trade the country’s natural resources on the international market, and freely 
borrow money in the country’s name. Also, they have the privilege of effecting transfers of 
ownership rights over national resources, goods and services that are internationally legally 
valid (ibid. 2004, pp. 269–270). Pogge stresses: 
‘Whoever can take power in such a country by whatever means can maintain his rule, even against 
widespread popular opposition, by buying the arms and soldiers he needs with revenues from the export of 
natural resources and with funds borrowed against future resource sales. The resource privilege thus gives 
insiders strong incentives towards the violent acquisition and exercise of political power, thereby causing 
coup attempts and civil wars.’ (Pogge, 2004, p. 270) 
Even a freshly elected government full of good intentions could not prevent the destructive 
effects of the global order, for it could not refuse to honour the debts of its predecessor(s) or it 
would be, at the very least, excluded from international financial markets. The government has 
therefore no other choice than to attempt to repay these odious debts, which prevents it spending 
money and resources on necessary reforms and programmes to improve the state of its country 
(ibid. 2004, pp. 271–272). 
Another consideration as to the unfairness of the global world order regards the fact that 
‘affluent states’ have benefited from large industrial activities that have harmed the 
environment and disadvantaged further deprived population. It is widely recognised that 
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members of disadvantaged states are the first victims of climate change and industrial pollution 
(mainly caused by foreign companies), which increases their burden. The more a state has 
benefited from such harmful activities, the more it owes to those suffering from them. 
Any country taking advantage of this unfair global system has the duty to rebalance power 
and global wealth through international solidarity so every human being can enjoy his RTD. It 
is important to note that for Pogge benefiting from the unfair global order implies more than a 
duty of solidarity; it is more importantly a failure of the negative duty not to harm others (Pogge, 
2004, pp. 275, 276). Consequently, ‘affluent states’ have two responsibilities: the positive moral 
duty to assist other states by systematically redistributing part of their unjust share of global 
wealth to the destitute through international solidarity; and the negative duty to stop harming 
the others and cease to take advantage of the unjust world order. A negative duty being stronger 
than a positive one, Pogge argues that ‘affluent states’ primarily have to take effective actions 
to stop the harm by fixing the rules of the world order. As a first step, Heads of states recognised 
in Addis Ababa in 2015 that disadvantaged countries need a more enabling international 
economic environment, which includes more ‘coherent and mutually supporting world trade, 
monetary and financial systems and strengthened and enhanced global economic governance.’ 
(United Nations, 2015, para. 9) But this discussion falls beyond the scope of this paper which 
focuses on the positive duty of international solidarity.  
c. The historical taint principle 
Hjorthen comes up with another principle that enables us to let history play a role in the 
duty allocation even when outcome responsibility or the benefit principle do not apply, like 
when there is a lack of causal connection between a state and deprived people7. He names it: 
the historical taint principle. It establishes a link between a state’s past activities and its duty of 
solidarity (2017, p. 400). The idea is: a state should not be able to claim ownership of resources 
that it obtained in the past from rights-violations, so these resources can be rightly reclaimed 
by people who need them more. In other words, among all capable agents, a state with such 
resources should contribute to a larger extent than the others to the duty of solidarity. Similarly, 
 
7 For example if one argues that a state should not be held responsible for actions committed by citizens who 
no longer exist because ‘one adopts an individualist perspective, according to which the duties of states derive 
from the duties of its individual citizens’ (2017, p. 399). 
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Thomas Pogge likes to recall that the social, economic and cultural development of Western 
societies over the centuries has been linked to enslavement, colonialism, environmental 
disasters, and even genocides. He regrets a tendency among ‘affluent states’ to see poverty only 
as a lack of means, techniques or knowledge. To him, persisting poverty is incontestably linked 
to history. He writes: ‘By seeing the problem of poverty merely in terms of assistance, we 
overlook that our enormous economic advantage is deeply tainted by how it accumulated over 
the course of one historical process that has devastated the societies and cultures of four 
continents.’ (Pogge, 2004, p. 262) Affluent states therefore owe it to disadvantaged population 
to tackle global wealth disparities by redistributing parts of their wealth. This principle can also 
concern states who obtained resources from activities harmful to the environment which 
therefore threaten the surrounding population’s RTD. Unlike the benefit principle, the historical 
taint principle does not need a causal link between such harmful activities and the deprivation 
of a population; a state with such resources must aid even when it is incapable of knowing 
which deprived population it harmed the most or from which situation it benefited the most. In 
other words, by not focusing on the historical wrongdoers but rather on the redistribution of 
resources resulting from wrongdoings, this principle enables to assign the duty of solidarity 
without having to appeal to a causal connection between the lack of enjoyment of the RTD and 
the capable duty bearers. 
iii. The lack of enforcement 
Using the OECD as the institution to enable capable states to perform their duty of 
international solidarity seems necessary. However, the OECD does not enjoy the same 
authoritative status towards its member as a state, for members of the OECD are not bound to 
contribute to the system of burden-sharing designed by the international institution the same 
way as citizens must contribute to their state’s. It does not constitute a powerful enforcing body, 
so its members are likely to remain subject to moral laxity. In such case, they may be blamed 
for not honouring their duty of solidarity, but there is no way to force them to contribute. 
Nevertheless, it remains important that there be such international institution able to determine 
states’ responsibilities and call for their contributions. This may result in a capable state’s 
citizens sanctioning their government for its moral laxity and demanding considerable actions. 
Surely, this rarely happens, and when it does, the blame rather concerns moral laxity for a 
negative duty, like it was the case when USA citizens protested the war in Iraq. But the rarity 
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of such events in support of the duty of solidarity may simply be the result of individuals 
ignoring the existence of such duty towards foreigners or what it requires. A task of the OECD 
would therefore be to foster ‘global education’ for citizens worldwide to better grasp their 
connections with foreigners and related duties. 
 
This chapter aimed to show that all states capable to aid individuals deprived of their RTD 
have a duty of international solidarity towards them, and that they should therefore engage in 
internationally coordinated collective actions. Most accounts of a duty to act upon rights 
violations usually found in the literature are limited to cases where basic rights are threatened. 
Miller writes for instance: ‘It is only when the scale of rights violations crosses a certain 
threshold that the idea of an international responsibility to protect human rights comes into 
play.’ That threshold is ‘basic rights – rights to life, bodily integrity, basic nutrition and health, 
and so forth.’ (2009, pp. 232, 233) Given the RTD, I attempted to demonstrate that the duty has 
a larger scope, because merely securing basic human rights is not enough; people have the right 
to decent live conditions where they are able to enjoy all human rights. Unfortunately, as we 
have seen, claiming the duty is one thing, identifying duty bearers is another. Because it is a 
general imperfect duty, the duty to aid faces problems of lack of coordination, moral laxity and 
allocation. I have explored solutions to fix these problems mostly based on Miller and Igneski’s 
respective works. As pointed by Igneski, a global problem such as the lack of enjoyment of the 
RTD should be met by a collective agent, and the costs of bearing the duty should be fairly 
distributed among its members by weighing backward and forward looking on a case by case 
basis. Convinced that it would not do the duty’s justice to assign it to an uncapable agent, I 
pleaded in favour of the primacy of the capacity principle. Due to their particular relationship 
with their citizens, each state should bear the duty to aid primarily towards its own citizens. 
Then, given their stronger capacity to act when working together and given the universal scope 
of the duty to aid, all capable states should join forces using an international institution like the 
OECD to realise their duty of international solidarity. We shall now investigate in the next 
chapter if the current scheme of development cooperation supervised by the OECD enables 
states to realise their duty of solidarity and foster the RTD worldwide. 
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Chapter 2. Development cooperation 
As shown in the previous chapter, states have a duty of international solidarity that they 
should choose to meet by cooperating internationally. The 1986 Declaration stresses indeed that 
‘States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating 
obstacles to development.’ (1986, para. 3) In practice, states have engaged in development 
cooperation for several decades, but this does not ensure that they meet their duty of solidarity. 
In fact, development cooperation has faced large criticisms over the years. Despite all the means 
at the disposal of capable states, development cooperation fails to end extreme poverty and to 
secure decent standards of living for all. Moreover, worldwide inequalities keep increasing 
(UNDP, 2016, pp. 30–31). The kind of development cooperation put in place over the past 
seventy years is not quite the kind of international solidarity necessary for the RTD. There 
seems to be two main reasons: the lack of proper motivation among capable states to contribute 
fairly; and the inadequacy of their strategies. Before going through these issues, we shall first 
understand how development cooperation works. 
I. The genesis of development cooperation 
At first, the notion of development was linked to the idea of ‘development stages’ that was 
introduced in the Covenant of the League of Nations after World War I, ‘thereby justifying a 
classification system according to which there were ‘developed’ nations at the top of the ladder’ 
while other nations were ‘underdeveloped’, i.e. ‘economically backward’ areas (Rist, 1997, pp. 
61, 72). With this in mind, the UN inaugurated in 1948 the ‘development age’ with the launch 
of the first technical assistance programme for economic development in ‘underdeveloped’ 
areas of the world (United Nations, 1948a, 1948b). Henceforth, such programme would become 
the means of states and international organisations to promote the conditions of development 
for better standards of life for all. In 1957, the United Nations decided to expand its programme 
for technical assistance and to set up a Special Development Fund. Despite international efforts, 
the gap in standards of living between the ‘economically advanced’ and the ‘less developed’ 
countries kept widening and the rate of economic and social progress in the latter stayed low 
(United Nations, 1961). To show the determination of member states to intensify their efforts 
to accelerate economic and social progress in ‘developing countries’, the 1960s were designated 
the United Nations Development Decade and a Capital Development Fund was established 
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(United Nations, 1960a). Later in the 1960s were created the big development organisations of 
our time, such as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), regional development banks for Africa and Asia, and finally, the merging of the 
Expended Programme for Technical Assistance and the Special Fund came to form the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP). All these agencies were designed to better support 
‘developing states’ in making societal changes necessary to secure man’s basic material needs 
and offer space to fulfil its aspirations. This was over fifty years ago, yet these agencies remain 
pillars of contemporary development cooperation.  
Supported by these international institutions, states engaging in development cooperation 
attempt to help people who lack access to basic needs by offering to their states technical and 
financial assistance; supporting their democratic institutions; and helping them to strengthen 
their economies by successfully mobilising their available resources and taking better 
advantage of market opportunities. They have thus engaged in economic reforms and measures 
of trade liberalisation to provide greater access to markets for all. They have as well continued 
to deliver technical and capital flows, which are now called official development assistance 
(ODA), or aid.  
i. Official Development Assistance, a.k.a. aid 
ODA is considered ‘the most important instrument of international cooperation, because it 
can be used at the discretion of the authorities in pursuit of policies’ (Sengupta, 1999, paras. 
61, 63). Besides, it helps countries to face financial crises and other emergencies, and it 
stimulates private investments in countries who struggle to attract them. ODA is delivered by 
official and executive agencies of states (for bilateral aid) and international organisations (for 
multilateral aid). Donors of aid are mainly DAC members (the 30 countries of the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD), but not exclusively. Data about ODA also comprises 
donations from some countries beyond the DAC (also often referred to as ‘emerging donors’), 
such as Qatar, Turkey, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.8 About 40% of the ODA from DAC countries 
 
8 In 2016, DAC members accounted for 86.9% of total ODA flows (OECD, 2017c). The advantage of the 
DAC is that its members pledge to fulfil certain obligations such as following DAC recommendations, reporting 
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is channelled through the multilateral aid system, i.e., through international institutions (OECD, 
2017b, p. 149). Aid serves to support development programmes mostly related to the building 
or renovation of infrastructures, the expansion or optimisation of agriculture, the strengthening 
of education or health commodities in another country (i.e. the recipient). It also entails 
humanitarian assistance provided directly after conflicts, shocks, and natural disasters to 
urgently answer the basic needs of the burdened populations9. The private sector (banks, 
businesses, associations, non-governmental organisations, and individuals) also provides 
external resources for development through international trade, foreign direct investments 
(FDI), loans, private export credits, other grants, donations and remittances. However, since 
these resources of development finance are not managed by governments, they are not part of 
the assistance provided via development cooperation. Nowadays, private flows are larger in 
volume than ODA, but most ‘developing countries’ struggle to attract the former and are 
therefore dependent on the latter. 
ii. States’ motives 
In order to grasp the concept of development cooperation, it is important to understand 
states’ motives for participating. As we saw in the first chapter, capable states have the moral 
duty resulting from the promotion of human rights. When pleading for states’ contribution to 
the UN Special Development Fund, Raymond Scheyven also exposes the idea of such moral 
imperative. However, Scheyven rather focuses on political and economic imperatives as 
reasons for development cooperation. Nowadays, the environmental imperative could as well 
be added to this list. These latter motives result from the fact that world nations are in ‘a state 
of interdependence and mutual vulnerability’; diseases, economic and environmental crises, 
and violent conflicts usually know no borders (Brock, 2009b, p. 175). Beyond the moral 
imperative, capable states engage in development cooperation because they cannot afford to let 
foreigners suffer from rights deprivation; assisting them is also in states’ interest. 
 
statistics and engaging in peer reviews, in order to improve aid quality and efficiency. This enhances their 
international credibility.  
9 More information is available in the online glossary of the DAC (http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-
glossary.htm). 
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a. The moral imperative 
The moral imperative comes from the strong belief that access to development is a 
prerequisite for human dignity and that it is therefore a human right that must be respected and 
promoted. Scheyven writes that principles of solidarity and equality – on which human 
civilisation essentially rests – demand action from ‘affluent states’. He explains that knowing 
the possibility of remedial action and the extent and urgency of the problem of poverty, ‘wealthy 
states’ would be expected to acknowledge the moral imperative to ‘not remain indifferent in 
the face of so much suffering.’ (Scheyven, 1954, p. 4) Scheyven even claims that the alarming 
situation faced by two-thirds of mankind imposes a solemn duty of international solidarity upon 
‘affluent states’. A couple of years before, in January 1949, President Truman of the United 
States had already expressed in the famous ‘point four’ of his Inaugural Address that: ‘Only by 
helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the 
decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.’ (quoted in Rist, 1997, p. 71) Gilbert Rist 
presents ‘point four’ as ‘a minor masterpiece’ which put forward ‘a new way of conceiving 
international relations’ for it was one of the first time that a text with such international 
readership was calling for development cooperation and stressing its necessity (1997, 72). This 
is the same idea of a right to a decent life that later led to the UN Declaration on the RTD. 
Besides this moral reason, there are as well political and economic motives for the creation of 
development cooperation. In fact, both Truman and Scheyven mention only briefly the moral 
imperative of international solidarity and rather focus on the political and economic 
imperatives. 
b. The political imperative 
For Scheyven, international solidarity is a political imperative, for improving worldwide 
life conditions contributes to worldwide peace. When the UN inaugurated the ‘development 
age’ in 1948 with the launch of the first technical assistance programme for economic 
development in ‘underdeveloped areas’ of the world, the idea was to create conditions of 
sufficient wellbeing and stability for peaceful relations among nations (United Nations, 1948a, 
1948b). Promoting peace is thus part of the political motivations behind the strive for better life 
conditions worldwide. Human suffering and dangerous life conditions can present a 
considerable risk to every nation, and thus also concern ‘affluent states’. World nations are in 
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‘a state of interdependence and mutual vulnerability’; diseases, economic and environmental 
crises, and violent conflicts usually know no borders (Brock, 2009, 175). Combating world 
poverty and great wealth disparities between nations greatly contributes to a diminution of 
international tensions. Struggling populations aspire towards better life conditions and they 
know that modern technique of industrialised nations can relieve them from difficult life 
conditions. Failing to respond to these legitimate aspirations means failing to give them reasons 
to ‘support a civilisation which cannot provide for their bare subsistence’ (Scheyven, 1954, p. 
4). As stated in the UN Charter, nations must aim at world peace and it can only be achieved if 
all nations enjoy economic and social advancement (United Nations, 1945). 
c. The economic imperative 
Then, states also have many economic motivations to engage in international cooperation, 
as it was already pointed by President Truman in his speech. He stated that the benefits of 
scientific knowledge and industrial progress should be made available to ‘underdeveloped 
areas’ of the world through technical assistance (at the image of the assistance already granted 
by the United States to parts of Latin America) for their economic improvement. Industrialised 
states had to assist ‘underdeveloped states’ because their poverty ‘is a handicap and a threat 
both to them and to more prosperous areas’, and that Western economies would also greatly 
benefit from development cooperation (quoted in Rist, 1997, pp. 71, 72). In line with Truman, 
Scheven also reiterated in his report that assisting the industrialisation of states struggling 
economically is necessary to expand markets and foreign trades and consequently global 
economic growth. Economic growth is not presented as the ultimate end of the Special 
Development Fund, but it is the dominant view within the UN that growth is an important means 
to raise standards of living. Scheyven briefly exposes several arguments. Firstly, the greater the 
support for the industrialisation of the underdeveloped countries, the greater the access to new 
supplies of primary products. Secondly, increasing the purchasing power of ‘developing 
countries’ opens up new opportunities for consumption of goods from the ‘industrialised 
countries’. Thirdly, international development contributes to diminishing tensions threatening 
the economy and security of prosperous states and to create new market opportunities for them, 
both by stimulating consumption thanks to an increased purchasing power among poorer 
populations and by making economies fitter for foreign trade and investments. Fourthly, 
strengthening economies and access to human needs in ‘developing states’ is as well important 
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to create prospects for young generations and therefore decrease unwanted immigration flows 
in ‘affluent states’. Fifthly, ODA can be strategic for an important donor hoping to become the 
privileged trading partner and/or allied of a ‘developing state’ in the future. And last but not 
least, Scheyven explains that ‘industrialised countries’ should reinvest their new financial 
resources (relieved by the fall in the expenditure on armaments resulting from more peaceful 
relations between nations).  
 
International assistance has thus always been a matter of beneficence and duty, but also a 
matter of self-interest on the part of ‘industrialised countries’ who see their prosperity 
dependent on that of the others. Nowadays, other kinds of imperatives may come to mind, like 
the need to support development to enable greater gender equality and women empowerment 
worldwide. And given the current environmental crisis occurring nowadays, Scheyven would 
now probably add the environmental imperative to its list.  
d. The environmental imperative 
The scope of environmental disasters and threats is such that it is crucial for states to 
cooperate and help each other in order to repair and contain ecological problems and threats. 
The environmental urgency is a global problem that needs international solidarity to enable all 
populations to possess the means to fix the damage and built resilience towards inevitable 
changes that result from the deterioration of nature. Like the global problem of the lack of 
enjoyment of RTD worldwide, this problem should be solved by international cooperation, and 
principles discussed earlier can be of use to allocate the burden among capable states. Since 
development cooperation is about improving people’s life conditions, it should be expected to 
serve sustainable projects safeguarding their environment. States should therefore feel urged to 
participate in development cooperation to an extent worthy of their capacity so they can 
contribute to the objective of securing a safe environment for all. Affluent states should aid 
more as they have more financial and material means.10 It is unfair to expect as much from other 
 
10 This refers to the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ stated in Principle 7 of The Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development: ‘States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.  In view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
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countries while they do not have the same capacity to deal with the problem. Through 
international solidarity, capable states help other states to carry this burden more easily.  
 
Despite other possible reasons behind states engagement in development cooperation, 
Scheyven’s report suggests that mainly the moral, political and economic imperatives are 
originally at the source of their motivation. Yet, development cooperation should primarily 
serve the moral duty rather than be used for such various objectives; the moral imperative ought 
to have the upper hand over any other motivation. Scheyven stressed that: ‘The poverty of the 
underdeveloped countries is such as to give moral considerations a clear precedence over 
economic considerations. The rich countries cannot base their attitude solely on their own 
interests but must take their stand on a sense and a duty of international solidarity.’ (1954, pp. 
5–6) In practice, however, moral motivations for development cooperation have always seemed 
to be put in the background for the benefit of development policies ‘preoccupied with the 
growth of output of material products and marketable services’ rather than with human needs 
(Sengupta, 1999, para. 48). This has major consequences on choices made by states regarding 
their way to cooperate, which plays a role in problems of development cooperation discussed 
here after.  
II. Problems of development cooperation 
Development cooperation is vastly reported and measured by agencies of the United 
Nations. Based on these analyses, states can show that it has led to good results.  Since the first 
Human Development Report in 1990, extreme poverty11 is estimated to have dropped by more 
than two-thirds and to have been below 11 percent globally in 2013 (while it was at 35 percent 
in 1990). This means that more than a billion people came out of extreme poverty (UNDP, 
2016, p. 26). Furthermore, undernourishment has almost decreased by half, and increased 
vaccination and actions worldwide to tackle malaria, tuberculosis, polio, measles, and HIV and 
 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of 
the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 
command.’ (United Nations, 1992) 
11 Defined by the United Nations during the 1995 World Summit for Social Development as: ‘a condition 
characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, 
health, shelter, education and information.’ (United Nations, 1995, §19) 
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AIDS have saved millions of lives (ibid. 2016, p. 27). Also, basic social services are much more 
accessible, especially regarding access to toilets, safe drinking water and schools. Finally, the 
protection of the environment has also improved, which is a major step forward for human 
health and the life quality of young and future generations (ibid. 2016, p. 28). 
Yet, despite all international efforts to support the development of poorer and fragile states, 
substantial human deprivation persists even though there are means to secure access to basic 
needs for everyone. In 2013, 766 million people were still living on less than $1.90 a day12, 
over 700 million adults were still lacking basic literacy skills and millions were suffering from 
easily preventable diseases and hunger. According to the UNDP, ‘one-third of the world’s food 
is wasted every year’, and only one-fourth of the food wasted would suffice to feed all people 
living in extreme poverty (ibid. 2016, p. 29)! At the same time, worldwide inequalities keep 
increasing. Despite the aid offered to ‘developing states’, the global poor stay poor while the 
global rich get richer. Clearly, development cooperation faces problems preventing it to realise 
its purpose. Based on the literature and other materials, I have pointed two main kinds of issues: 
the financing gap, notably due to moral laxity; and the misuses and inappropriate solutions 
deployed with development cooperation, mostly due to lack of transparency and accountability 
throughout the development process and also to donors’ patronising attitude. 
i. The financing gap 
Enhancing development worldwide to secure the RTD requires important financial means. 
It is difficult to evaluate how much is needed, but when it established the capital development 
fund in the 60s, the UN urged for a substantial increase of flows ‘so as to reach as soon as 
possible approximately 1 per cent of the combined national incomes of the economically 
advanced countries’ (United Nations, 1960b). This 1 per cent target was estimated to 
correspond to the amount necessary to reach a growth rate of 5 per cent or more in the national 
incomes of ‘developing countries’. However, this calculation was very approximative as it 
heavily depended on the international economic context and demography (United Nations, 
1962, p. 84). The target changed with the Strategy for the Second United Nations Development 
Decade in which the UN called on economically advanced countries to exert their best efforts 
 
12 Which is the international poverty line drawn by the World Bank in 2015 (The World Bank Group, 2016). 
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to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 per cent of their gross national income13 at market price 
by 1975 (United Nations, 1970, para. 43). The aimed growth rate was as well reconsidered and 
set to reach an average annual rate of about 3.5 per cent of gross product per head in ‘developing 
countries’ combined (United Nations, 1970, para. 14). Unfortunately, the target has never been 
met. The grant-equivalent ODA figure for 2018 is equivalent to 0.31% of the DAC donors’ 
combined gross national income, well below the target ratio of 0.7% ODA to GNI. Five DAC 
members – Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom – met or 
exceeded the 0.7% target. Non-DAC donors Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, whose ODA 
is not counted in the DAC total, provided 1.10% and 0.95% respectively of their GNI in 
development aid (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2019). 
Contributions of donor states to international development remain almost insignificant 
compared to what they could offer. It is true that the incomes of the South and North countries 
have been converging, which led to a significant drop of relative global inequality. However, 
absolute inequality has increased dramatically since the mid-1970s, meaning that the richest 
part of the world population got even richer while the poorest stayed poor. After the beginning 
of the second millennium, inequalities grew even further, since over the years ‘50 percent of 
the increase in global wealth benefited only the wealthiest 1 percent of the world’s population 
[whereas the poorest 50 percent] received only 1 percent of the increase.’ (UNDP, 2016, pp. 
30–31) In other words, people did not equitably benefit from economic development, and many 
were left behind. A country’s development is above all its own responsibility, so it is up to 
governments to better distribute the benefits of development amongst their populations. 
Nevertheless, even with stronger redistributive schemes, ‘developing countries’ need more 
resources to maximise the wellbeing of their populations. The duty of solidarity requires much 
more support from the international community towards the most destitute. As pointed out by 
Raymond Scheyven: ‘The campaign against poverty is a vast operation which requires the 
mobilisation of great financial resources. While it is true that the wealthier countries themselves 
have a growing need of capital to ensure their own development, experience has shown that 
they are capable of enormous efforts when circumstances require.’ (Scheyven, 1954, pp. 1–3) 
 
13 At that time, the 0.7% target ratio was based on the growth national product (GNP), but nowadays it is 
calculated according to the GNI. 
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Besides, aid has lost quality and consistency. Its amount tends to be inflated by entailing 
kinds of expenditures that should not be part of aid because they do not bring new capital to 
‘developing countries’, such as migration costs, debt reliefs, administration costs, or even costs 
related to foreign students. For example, these expenditures – also called shadow aid – counted 
for 21% of Belgian ODA in 2017 (Van Haute, 2019). They are necessary but should be 
additional to ODA, not part of it. Additionally, the financing gap is worsened by the vast amount 
of financial flows given by the South to the North which diminish the impact of aid. For 
instance, there are payments from ‘developing countries’ for large debt repayments, profit 
remittances, and investments in capital markets in the North (Ortiz, 2007, p. 3). In fact, these 
payments are so important that it is often claimed that the South finances the North rather than 
the opposite. The debt burdens mostly result from certain development programmes – such as 
the ‘Structural Adjustment Programmes’ (SAPs) launched in the eighties – which entailed loans 
from the World Bank or the IMF that were contracted under variable rates. Such conditions led 
to major flows of debt services that eventually exceeded the inflows of new capital given to 
‘developing countries’ (Tomann, 1988, p. 204). Poorer countries with no foreign exchange 
reserves ended up in a conflicting situation with their development needs and economic position 
in the world market since they had ‘to achieve trade surpluses in order to finance interest 
payments and debt redemption’ (ibidem). This complicated situation led to recipients suffering 
from debt burdens they could not pay back, and to the debt crisis of the 80s. Consequently, the 
international community started to recognise that external debts are causing structural 
problems. States have thus committed multiple times to relieve poorest countries from debt 
burdens, but all proposed solutions turned out to be unsuited and insufficient (Millet, 2003), as 
it is discussed in the next section. In 1996, the IMF and the World BANK launched the HIPC 
(heavily indebted poor countries) Initiative to lower the amounts of their debt services to a 
sustainable level (IMF, 2019). However, it only concerns 36 countries and its aim is merely to 
make their debt sustainable so that the HIPC stop asking for debt restructuration and delaying 
repayments. The initiative is a two-step process monitored by the two institutions and 
conditioned by strategically chosen criteria enabling the latter to enhance SAPs and provide 
further loans. The debt burdens also come from the choice of ‘industrialised countries’ to 
privilege concessional loans over grants when delivering assistance. Rather than affecting their 
budgets, such kind of assistance even enables them to gain some money. These loans entailed 
a grant element of at least 25% and enable the recipient governments to finance development 
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programmes, but the latter must face interest repayments often leading to debt distress. In 2014, 
professionals warned that ‘If the OECD DAC review does not bring an end to lax reporting 
criteria, aid could be artificially inflated by more than 50 billion euros in coming years.’ (Colin 
& Kwakkenbos, 2014) So in 2018, the OECD finally adapted its way of measuring net ODA. 
From now on, only the grant elements of concessional loans are counted as ODA and interest 
repayments are no longer deducted from ODA. These measures should encourage for more 
‘concessionality’. Nevertheless, they will not tackle the lack of ODA due to the reticence of 
‘affluent states’ to meet their duty of solidarity. Besides, the financing gap is not the only 
problem with development cooperation; ODA is also widely misused and misallocated. 
ii. Misuses and inappropriate solutions 
The lack of results of development cooperation is not only due to a lack of funding; it is 
also due to misuses of aid and inappropriate solutions. Fixing the financing gap will thus not 
suffice; if states intend to fulfil their duty of solidarity, they must care about their assistance 
bringing results. So far, ODA was used in ways that did not effectively improve the situation 
of poorer populations. Instead, it has sometimes worsened their disadvantage or has failed its 
purpose to assist due to the patronising attitude of the donor states. 
a. Lack of transparency and accountability 
The most problematic aspect of ODA is the fact that it sometimes worsens the situation of 
the recipient population and therefore harms them. Then, not only does ODA fail as a means to 
assist, it also appears as a moral issue, for one should do no harm. It happens when ODA faces 
a lack of transparency in the decisions and the processes for allocating it, which leaves the door 
wide open to all kinds of additional issues (such as misallocations or misappropriations) and 
leads to cases of corruption. For instance, local authorities could be persuaded to let 
multinationals exploit local resources or be tempted to accept bad trade deals (which may, for 
example, jeopardise local activities due to a lack of competitiveness compared with 
international businesses) in exchange for a part of ODA. Foreign firms from Western countries 
have often bribed officials in poor countries to obtain public contracts or to sell non-competitive 
and low-quality goods and services. Such common practices obviously attract thugs and crooks 
in power who have no incentive to help their people ‘as their continuing in power depends more 
on the local elite, foreign governments, and corporations.’ (Brock, 2009a, p. 123) The best hope 
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to eradicate these practices and change the ‘pervasive culture of corruption that is now deeply 
entrenched in many developing countries’ (ibid. 2004, pp. 268–269) is to have full transparency 
and hold all stakeholders of development cooperation accountable for their actions. Currently, 
donors are usually not held accountable for the disappointing results of the bad foreign 
development strategies they undertook. Besides, recipients also do not feel responsible for bad 
outcomes of those strategies because they are not the ones who developed them. These 
strategies are mostly based on international goals like the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), which were mainly drafted by ‘affluent countries’. Such goals have the advantage of 
providing a common vision for international development and a framework for policy-making 
and common action, but the strategic approaches for achieving them are too simplistic and often 
insensitive to diverse contexts, leading to a lack of ownership of the MDGs in recipient 
countries (Ramalingam, 2013, pp. 55, 56). The fact that no one is held accountable for bad 
results gives aid agencies the possibility of discarding the ‘precautionary principle’, i.e. the 
establishment of a strategy to cope with possible bad consequences before acting. 
Consequently, aid agencies have carte blanche to engage in any practice they want according 
to their own interests, and to take credit for positive outcomes while neglecting the problems 
they might cause, notably in terms of human rights and human wellbeing. In official reports, 
actors make the world believe that aid only contributes to the greater good, but they omit to 
mention all the bad to which it has also contributed. Official reports are supposed to provide 
some external accountability, but sceptical people criticise the fact that most official reports do 
not reflect the reality, and that their lack of objectivity puts the results they are depicting into 
question (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 110). Ramalingam for instance mentions the problems with 
the Millennium Development Goals. When one reads that some targets of MDGs have been 
met, one usually thinks that development assistance has been doing a good job. Yet, when 
looking at the numbers, it seems that development assistance has little to do with such 
accomplishments. For instance, regarding the fact that the proportion of abjectly poor people 
globally fell, numbers show that around half of the reduction was attributable to China, whereas 
for the rest of the world, the proportion hardly moved. In Globalisation and its Discontents, 
Joseph Stiglitz even argues that ‘China had succeeded despite aid agency advice, not because 
of it.’ Then, Dani Rodrik also claimed: ‘China implemented the policies [for] history’s greatest 
poverty eradication programme prior to, and independently from, the millennium declaration 
and the MDGs.’ (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 101) Besides, official reports are good at manipulating 
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numbers thanks to ‘bunching-up tactics’ (i.e. the setting of low goals easy to achieve) and 
accounting trickery. Coming back to the example on the reduction of poverty, there have been 
claims based on data provided by the World Bank that the MDG on poverty has been met. But 
given the fact that the data only consider one of the nine indicators (the indicator on income 
poverty) and fail to mention any progress on the other eight indicators of this MDG, those 
claims were far from the truth. Undeniably, ‘income poverty is only one aspect of deprivation; 
it is important to acknowledge other [human development] factors, such as under-nutrition, 
access to services, and minimum basic needs.’ (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 102) This is just one of 
many other examples offered by Ramalingam. As argued in the next chapter, if states wish to 
meet their duty of solidarity by means of ODA, they will have to find a way that: is fully 
transparent; compels donors to act according to the precautionary principle and to answer for 
their actions; lies in a strategy developed by the donor and recipient together; can objectively 
and honestly show the good and the bad it has done; makes all stakeholders accountable for 
their actions. Otherwise, ODA might end up worsening their situation, which is morally 
unacceptable, even when unintended. As goes the saying: hell is paved with good intentions. 
b. The patronising attitude 
When ODA does not worsen the situation of ‘developing states’, it still faces many issues 
preventing it from appearing as an adequate means of fulfilling the duty of solidarity. Since 
Truman’s Inaugural Address in 1949, the mission of the North is no longer to spread 
civilisation, but to enhance development among economically backward nations – using the 
example of their own model. In the second chapter, we discussed how, besides the moral 
imperative, ‘affluent states’ also have selfish reasons to assist the others. When such reasons 
take over the duty of solidarity, donors tend to adopt a patronising attitude that consolidates the 
control of the North over the South. This has engendered much criticism, because it jeopardises 
development efforts due to inappropriate solutions with a high degree of inefficiency and 
numerous bad results. Almost as if Truman had already predicted such criticism, he also stated 
that: ‘The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we 
envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.’ 
(quoted in Rist, 1997, p. 71) The plan was to fill in the gap between the ‘underdeveloped’ and 
the ‘affluent states’ using the scientific knowledge of the latter and industrial progress. Easterly 
explains that this programme resulted from the false assumption that, because ‘affluent states’ 
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‘somehow wound up with prosperity and peace, [they] know enough to plan for other societies 
to have prosperity and peace.’ (Easterly, 2006, p. 26) As opposed to what Truman claimed, this 
assumption led to an attitude that is reminiscent of the old imperialism. According to Easterly, 
this is the same patronising mind-set one can hear in colonisers’ narratives, as there were 
already similar ‘humanitarian instincts at work during colonialism’ (Easterly, 2006, p. 278). 
Starting from the 1870s, colonial policies implemented in the name of ‘civilisation’ included 
education programmes, primary health care systems, and village credit banks (Rist, 1997, pp. 
57, 58). Such colonial policies were at the basis of many development programmes (Easterly, 
2006, p. 279). Despite the shift from racism towards respect for equality, the paternalist and 
coercive strain inherited from that time has not disappeared. For instance, bilateral aid used to 
be heavily tied, meaning it could only be used by a recipient country for the procurement of 
foreign goods and services provided by the donor country. Tied aid has led to many 
controversies, for it has been proven to slow down the development of recipients and to mainly 
support the interests of those already advantaged on global markets. Fortunately, in 2014, the 
untying of aid from DAC countries reached a peak value of 78.6% (OECD, 2017a, p. 8), 
showing the way towards a full untying of aid. Ramalingam also criticises the condescending 
attitude of the donors. He claims that they have a certain understanding of how the world works, 
and development assistance is a reflection of it – just like colonialism used to be a reflection of 
the former European perception of the world. Nowadays, ‘affluent states’ assume that 
development challenges can all be resolved with their expertise because they are the example 
to follow. With the help of institutions that they have themselves designed, such as the World 
Bank or the IMF, ‘affluent states’ export solutions and methods to relieve countries from 
poverty that are fully prescriptive and designed with a limited understanding of the local 
problems (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 62). The best example is probably the failure of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that were undertaken in the eighties as a new strategy in 
response to the lack of results of aid programmes of the sixties and seventies. The donors 
blamed this lack of results on the bad governance of the recipients and thereafter introduced 
SAPs ‘to induce governments to change’ (Easterly, 2006, p. 272). These ‘shock therapies’ 
entailed loans that were given by the World Bank or the IMF on condition that recipients would 
undertake specific reforms to radically and rapidly change their political and economic cultures, 
so they could benefit from free markets. This made development aid more donor-driven than 
ever. Such a patronising attitude prevents the recipients having a say in their own development 
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policies. This is also inefficient, for it brings about injustices and inappropriate solutions. SAPs 
have been counterproductive because they recommend austerity measures to ensure debt 
repayment and economic restructuring, which reduced spending for social infrastructures 
crucial for the population's wellbeing. Under the SAPs reforms, many public sectors were 
privatised, leaving basic services such as water or electricity distribution dependent upon the 
interests of foreign investors. Besides, many donor-made solutions expressly include the use of 
Western-made goods for which the recipients must pay intellectual propriety costs. 
Additionally, the ‘developing countries’ were encouraged to focus on the massive exportation 
of their raw materials, which made their economies completely reliant on the commodities 
market. It did not take long before it could be seen that these exported methods were failing 
too. Such ‘shock therapy’ hardly ever works and SAPs have met with lots of criticism over the 
years, especially because the loans entailed important debt services, as explained at the 
beginning of this chapter. Yet today, ‘affluent states’ are still making the mistake of exporting 
solutions by involvement in foreign countries’ development policies. The IMF and World Bank 
have said to have learned from their mistake by replacing the SAPs with ‘Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers’ (PRSP) which are drafted by the recipient country, but they still closely follow 
the recommendations of the two Western institutions. When placing emphasis on the rapid 
introduction of free markets in ‘developing countries’, donors have forgotten the time it took to 
create a favourable environment and appropriate institutions for their own markets to develop. 
They have also forgotten that their wealth and power are largely linked to rights-violations, 
environmental degradations and other abuses that should never have been part of the 
development process. Additionally, they have not considered that free markets must be adapted 
‘to local traditions and circumstances, and not [developed] through reforms designed by 
outsiders.’ (ibid., 2006, pp. 60, 61) ‘As a result, strategies are clumsily undertaken, supply-
oriented, and riddled with naïve assumptions about people, political processes, and the nature 
of change.’ (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 72) By perpetuating a system doomed to failure, the 
‘affluent states’ are neglecting the interests of the recipients and reinforcing their dependence. 
Even if donors are not purposely doing this, this patronising attitude is unacceptable. It is time 
to stop trying to design comprehensive reforms for ‘poor countries’ supposed to create 
benevolent laws and good institutions to foster economic development. It is not up to the donors 
to impose their solutions like ‘shock therapists’ have done (Easterly, 2006, pp. 100, 116).  
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Ramalingam adds that current aid agencies tend to adopt a prescriptive approach when it 
comes to developing their strategies: ‘puzzle solving; blueprinted, designed, and specified at 
the top; and implemented by rote at the bottom.’ (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 48) Therefore, local 
implementers of such strategies must overcome their unsuitability for the country’s context and 
culture. Aid agencies do not learn enough about the local complexities; they focus on clear-cut 
directive policy prescriptions. They are entrenched and conservative, which often makes things 
worse for the recipients (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 39). They must stop imposing their views and 
start cooperating more with the recipient populations who have better knowledge of their life 
conditions, culture, environment and needs. The lack of knowledge of donors about the social 
reality within a community can indeed be very problematic. Several examples are presented in 
the film-documentary Poverty, Inc. (Matheson Miller, 2014). One example relating to foreign 
assistance to Haiti after the earthquake of 2010 particularly caught my attention: when 
analysing the crisis, aid agencies thought that it would be very useful to send as many solar 
panels as possible to provide free electricity to the population. Although the idea seemed 
perfect, it had no consideration for the small local solar panel industry. Who is going to buy 
something they can get for nothing? No one. So, when the aid agencies stopped sending free 
solar panels, the country no longer had a local solar panel industry and had to import panels 
from foreign countries. The problem with foreign assistance is that the donor always comes 
with a predetermined and general solution to a part of the problem. This is not cooperation; it 
is imposition. Had the agencies supported the local industry so it could provide cheap panels to 
the population, Haiti would now be able to rely on its own solar panels. Such stories keep 
repeating themselves. Another example is that of Toms shoes. For each pair of Toms shoes 
bought, one pair is donated to ‘poor countries’. This sounds great, everyone is happy; the 
customers feel they are doing a good deed, the company benefits from good publicity, and the 
poor receive free shoes! Is everyone happy? No, not the local shoemakers who have to close 
their businesses due to such free supplies. The same applies to local clothes industries and 
farms. How is a country supposed to develop economically if it relies on imports and donations 
for everything? The development industry is full of such examples. On 17th December 2017, 
Jean-Paul Augereau, the creator of the ‘Safe Water Cube’, was interviewed on the French 
channel LCI in the emission ‘Tous Acteurs du Changement’ (Amicone, 2017). He explained 
how the cube is the ‘innovation that ends the world crisis of access to drinkable water’, and 
how it is particularly practical since it needs no electricity, no maintenance, no chemical 
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products, and emits zero CO2, simply providing access to a source of water. The solution to the 
big problem of lack of clean water is simply for the West to donate one SWC per village. Is it 
that simple though? One can only hope that this association learns from the failures of others 
and takes the time to reflect with the population on the needs of their village and the best way 
this potential solution could help them. There are probably many places where it would be 
welcomed, but there are also many places where it might be useless or even have drawbacks. I 
can already think of two examples: first, if the reason why a village does not have water is 
because all the sources are empty, or because the first source available is at four kilometres 
away and the population cannot reach it due to the armed militia threatening their lives on the 
way, then the SWC will absolutely not resolve their lack of access to drinkable water, and it 
might even bring more harm than good if it leads the donors to think that the problem is solved 
and other solutions do not have to be subsidised anymore. Second, if the association gives a 
SWC to a village and appoints a random person to take care of it without discussing the matter 
with other villagers, the SWC might bring tensions within the community. For instance, an 
anthropologist once told me that a group of Western engineers once went to an African village 
to install a big water dam that would give the local population access to water. Once they had 
finished, they went back to their country, very proud of their achievement that would 
revolutionise the lives of thousands. What they did not know is that, once they left, a group of 
people came and destroyed the whole dam. Why? Because the engineers had chosen people at 
random to help them build it without consideration for social hierarchies. Therefore, the chiefs 
felt insulted and refused to allow a construction in which they had had no say to remain in their 
village. This example clearly shows how taking local culture into account is crucial in problem-
solving. The development industry tends to forget this, and think that only money, 
infrastructure, institutions, and programmes matter. But ‘those plans at the top are not connected 
to reality at the bottom’ and what works at home might be a total failure abroad (Easterly, 2006, 
p. 17). Easterly stresses, for example, that markets are a great way to improve economic 
development, but there must be checks and balances to prevent market participants cheating 
and jeopardising the whole system (Easterly, 2006, p. 77). In ‘affluent countries’, this can be 
done for instance through courts and institutions preventing corruption or guaranteeing goods’ 
quality. Each disadvantaged country should decide what the solutions are that would work best 
in regard to the local culture and environment. They must help themselves, and the ‘affluent 
states’ must help them with ideas, technology, funds, fair cooperation and trade only when the 
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disadvantaged country judges it useful. To be sure, borrowing solutions from other settings can 
be a good idea, but, as Ramalingam notes, it must be done with ‘consideration of the context in 
which they are being used’ (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 124), and only insiders can do that. There 
is, however, something that Easterly thinks indispensable for markets to work anywhere: 
property rights. But would this not be the imposition of a Western idea again? He does not think 
so, because he says that – as in the case of other market complexities – it should not be imposed 
from the top, but should rather gradually emerge from the bottom up, in a way that does not 
neglect complex social customs and beliefs (ibid. 2006, pp. 90, 96). This is an important detail, 
because some ‘developing countries’ have encountered many problems when introducing 
property rights from the top. In particular, this enables the government to sell huge pieces of 
land to big multinational corporations, leading to the squatters on those lands being expelled, 
for instance in Ethiopia (Demmer, 2017). Paradoxically, this means that with property rights 
the problem of ‘land expropriation’ can arise. Again, instead of focusing on the needs and 
desires of the population, the government follows the Western idea that it must do whatever it 
can to enter the global market and attract foreign investments. But many of those investments 
have brought industrialised agriculture at the expense of small local farmers, polluted the 
environment, destroyed the soil, deforested hectares of land, and created new flows of refugees 
who now depend on humanitarian assistance (whereas they used to depend only on a natural 
environment they had studied for centuries). They do not even help to feed the population, since 
most produce goes for export (Demmer, 2017). In the end, such financial investments more 
often help to keep self-interested and unaccountable governments in place, rather than serve the 
interests of the population. If it is aimed to assist the people, it is crucial that ODA be allocated 
to projects developed with them, for they best know what they need and how to implement it. 
 
To summarise, development cooperation does not fulfil its purpose because flows of ODA 
are too little and delivered in ways that are inefficient. The trillions of dollars allocated via 
development programmes over the past seventy years have done little good and even some bad. 
There is a lack of transparency enabling too many actors to make many unfulfilled promises 
and mistakes for which they are not held accountable. The patronising attitude of the donor 
community leads to a lack of home-grown solutions and communication with the local 
populations. This is not to say that there is no success story and that aid agencies are useless. 
They can help considerably to improve the life quality of many, but the good they bring does 
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not forgive the bad they do. Aid is currently not an appropriate means to honour the duty of 
solidarity. 
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Chapter 3. The human rights-based approach 
Political and economic motivations for international solidarity are important because they 
can convince many states to engage in development cooperation. However, they are quite self-
oriented and might generate a kind of solidarity that does not really care for the interests of 
disadvantaged people. This can lead to problematic situations where development cooperation 
may cause more harm than do good, which fails the duty of solidarity and goes against the duty 
to do no harm. When states began to engage in development cooperation, they had a vision of 
development that first led to a ‘charity approach’ then to a ‘needs-based approach’. The first 
encouraged states to assist ‘developing communities’ for reasons of pure beneficence, whereas 
the second limited aid to short-vision programmes to fulfil the recipients’ basic needs. These 
approaches led to problems notably because they were focussed on immediate results rather 
than lasting changes and they used methods inconsistent with their end, where human rights 
concerns were often left aside. The rights-based approach (HRBA)  ‘grew out of a conceptual 
paradigm shift in the understanding of development as a multidimensional improvement in 
people’s capability to lead lives that they value’, contrary to the previous visions of 
development (FAO, 2017, p. 6). Consequently, it has ‘developed as an approach that could 
remedy the deficiencies in the charity and needs-based approaches that preceded it, by working 
towards systemic changes and addressing the root causes of poverty, including discrimination, 
marginalisation, exploitation and abuse.’ (2017, p. 6) The HRBA provides guidance on the way 
human development should be pursued. It is defined by the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) as ‘a conceptual framework of human development that is normatively 
based on international human rights standards and operationally directed at promoting and 
protecting human rights.’ (FAO, 2017, p. 6) Applying the HRBA to development requires to 
respect human rights principles, which would help preventing many problems of development 
cooperation. Besides, the HRBA would make concerns for human rights always come first in 
decision-making and when assessing methods and objectives in order to promote human dignity 
and the rights of affected populations. The RTD calls for the HRBA to development because it 
specifically demands the respect of human rights principles (such as participation, non-
discrimination and human dignity) and aims at the full realisation of human rights throughout 
all phases of the development process, thus at the decision-making level about policy priorities, 
when formulating, implementing and monitoring development programmes, and when 
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evaluating their outcomes and elaborating corrective actions (Sengupta, 2008, para. 75). Under 
the HRBA, states’ assistance would no longer be encouraged by a charity mindset but would 
henceforth be about enabling right holders to claim and enjoy their human rights and duty 
bearers to carry out their duties. Having the realisation of human rights and thus of the RTD as 
essential goal of international solidarity would enable states to fulfil both their duty of solidarity 
and duty to do no harm.  
I. Human rights principles 
Following the HRBA implies the respect of certain principles. In the context of the HRBA 
to the right to food supported by the FAO, human rights principles are referred to under the 
English acronym PANTHER for participation, accountability, non-discrimination and equality, 
transparency, human dignity, empowerment, and the rule of law. The PANTHER framework 
should be applied to the HRBA to development. Respecting PANTHER principles would 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of aid. More importantly, it would prevent states to 
harm aid recipients, by leading to ‘the non-discriminatory and informed participation’ of 
concerned communities in inclusive, equitable, ‘transparent and rules-based decision-making 
processes, that are based on the recognition of their dignity and on the accountability of all 
actors involved.’ (FAO, 2017, p. 6) A needs-based approach can possibly lead to similar 
successful methods of development when human rights principles are respected. The problem 
is that such approach does not demand that it always be the case, hence the methods often 
disregard human rights considerations. The HRBA has the advantage of always care for human 
rights standards. The PANTHER principles relate to the human rights to participation, equality, 
effective remedy and due process of law, and access to information. 
i. The participation principle 
Respecting the principle of participation requires that inclusive, free and meaningful 
participation (individual or collective) be always accessible and encouraged (in the formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, programmes or projects). It is the right 
of all persons to be consulted and take part actively in the development process that concern 
them because they have freedoms of expression and information, and they deserve to have a 
say in the conduct of public affairs affecting them. Since development is about their dignity and 
wellbeing, human beings must be the beneficiary of development, and as beneficiary, they must 
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be able to take part to it (United Nations, 1986, art. 2). Besides, the process needs the 
collaboration of affected people to be successful. People will be more likely to support it when 
they were consulted and even more when they are involved in it. Furthermore, solutions must 
be home-grown to be working and overcome structural inequalities. Contextual knowledge is 
necessary for development projects and policies to be relevant, sustainable, adapted to the 
culture and means of the community and supportive of its resilience. Poverty must not be 
conceived of as a general problem that one agenda can remedy; it is ‘a complicated tangle of 
political, social, historical, institutional, and technological factors’ that demands a local 
approach (Easterly, 2006, p. 6). So, the people must be consulted to determine which 
development policies and projects they want to realise their human rights. The development 
process must be owned by the people themselves and aid must be demand-driven, not donor-
driven. This means that donors should adapt to the demands, goals and agendas of recipient 
countries, not the other way around. Respecting the principle of participation would hopefully 
enable to leave top-down agendas aside and focus on long-term effects with consideration for 
the diversity of needs and views within targeted populations. 
ii. The accountability principle 
The accountability principle is about assuring access to effective mechanisms through 
which one can hold stakeholders (i.e. any authority, non-state actor or individual taking part to 
the development process) responsible for their actions (or lack of action), so people can keep 
control over decisions affecting their lives. The mechanisms must entail the monitoring of the 
effective realisation of human rights and provide remedies in cases of violation or impairment 
by virtue of the right to effective remedy and due process (FAO, 2017, p. 83). This is crucial in 
order to make stakeholders comply to their obligations and fulfil their engagements, as well as 
to transcend power asymmetries between right holders and duty bearers. 
iii. The non-discrimination and equality principle 
The non-discrimination and equality principle implies that there be no form of exclusion or 
limitations based on sex, race, age, disability, language, religion, political affiliation, culture, 
origins, sexual orientation or other status in the realisation of human rights. All persons have 
the right to be treated equally: they have equal rights and they deserve equal opportunities and 
equal protection of the law. Nobody should be victim of any discrimination preventing him 
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from having the same ability as other persons to enjoy a decent life. ‘Distinctions based on 
reasonable and objective criteria are not discriminatory’ (FAO, 2017, p. 83 box 2) and are 
necessary to prioritise the needs of those who lag the most behind in enjoying their rights. This 
reminds ‘the Rawlsian Difference Principles that require maximizing the advantage of the 
worst-off, no matter how that affects the advantages of all others.’ (Sengupta, 1999, para. 31) 
Consequently, the development process should be equitable, thus it should aim at the constant 
improvement in human wellbeing starting from the persons most in need. Resources for and 
benefits of development must be equitably allocated according to persons’ ability to enjoy their 
rights in order to leave no one behind. This non-discrimination principle gives particular 
attention to the poorer and most marginalised people in decision-making to foster a 
development that is sustainable for all and where all nations and individuals enjoy an equal 
opportunity for development. (Ngang et al., 2018) 
iv. The transparency principle 
The whole process must be fully transparent for affected populations by virtue of their 
freedom of information and to be informed participants and empowered claimants. They must 
have free and easy access to procedures, discussions and decisions that concern their rights, 
freedoms and wellbeing in order to hold donors accountable for the failure in the fulfilment of 
their duties. Programmes and objectives must be clearly and openly defined and accessible in 
relevant languages and formats. Besides, mistakes will be less likely to be repeated and there 
will be more sharing of best practices if all information about failures and successes are 
publicised. It might even result in increased collaborations, with people joining forces on 
common projects rather than get involved in isolated projects despite their common objectives. 
The international community has made some progress over the years in the direction of more 
transparency. In 2011, donors agreed in Busan to launch three new initiatives: the International 
Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI); the Open Aid Partnership (OAP); and the Open 
Government Partnership (OGP). The first proposes common standards for an information 
database designed to incorporate ‘all development finance’, the second consists in a web-based 
mapping tool enabling citizens to check where financing is being directed and report on it, and 
the third encourages governments to ensure greater transparency and improved governance 
(Mawdsley et al., 2013, paras 6, 8). However, these efforts for more transparency can only show 
real effect if they are accompanied by equal efforts to foster the other human rights principles. 
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v. The human dignity principle 
As explained at length in the first chapter, the idea of human dignity is at the foundation of 
human rights philosophy. Therefore, the human dignity principle should inevitably be part of 
the HRBA to development. It means that because of their inherent worth as human beings – 
regardless of their social status or special attributes, all persons have a right to always be treated 
with respect, i.e. with consideration and esteem for their person, their integrity (physical and 
mental), their values and opinions, etc. 
vi. The empowerment principle 
The empowerment principle is about strengthening the capacity of right holders to claim 
and enjoy their rights ‘and building the capacity of duty bearers to respond to related 
demands’(FAO, 2017, p. 84). Empowering the people is about giving them the ways and means 
to become active and responsible actors throughout the entire development process affecting 
their lives and feel accountable for its success as well as failure. As Michael Matheson Miller 
(the director of the film-documentary Poverty, Inc.) nicely put it: poor people must not be 
treated as objects of our charity, objects of our pity, or objects of our compassion; poor people 
are subjects, they must be recognised as the protagonists of their own story of development 
(Matheson Miller, Weber, & Easterly, 2016). While the participation principle focuses on 
consulting the people and giving them a say in the development process, this empowerment 
principle rather stresses the need of certain infrastructures and social environment for them to 
be able to take their problems into their own hands. It relates to the right to education because 
people must learn about their rights and duties and how to claim and honour them. To be 
empowered, the respect of the other human rights principles is important because people need 
access to information, equality of opportunity, protection against discriminations, etc. This 
principle also calls for more cooperation between local agents and other stakeholders. The latter 
should aim to strengthen the capacities of the former to solve their development issues. 
vii. The rule of law principle 
Another important human rights principle is the rule of law. Fair rules and laws, and the 
enforcement of justice are important for the respect of the other human rights principles and the 
realisation of human rights. Authorities and other stakeholders must legitimately exercise their 
51 
 
rights and duties in accordance with rules and procedures. The development process must be 
based on fair decision-making and independent ruling. 
viii. The precaution principle 
In addition to PANTHER principles, the HRBA to development should entail the respect of 
the principle of precaution. There must be an assessment of development methods before acting 
and then strategies must be elaborated to cope with potential bad consequences (no method is 
risk-free). This principle should enable to prioritise methods with the best prospect of success 
and prevent those that could worsen the recipients’ situation. This means that there must not be 
a big risk of it being misappropriated or misallocated, and no one should be harmed by its 
consequences. When countries cannot trust governments to use the assistance received to 
benefit their people, they must try to directly offer assistance to the people who need it and want 
it without passing by their governments. 
 
Let us take stock. States have a duty of solidarity that they could fulfil through development 
cooperation if its problems are fixed. For this, the HRBA to development is promising. This 
means that the whole development process – not merely its objectives – would respect, promote 
and protect human rights and be guided by the PANTHER principles. Satisfying all these 
principles would make donors feel compelled to be honest about their intentions and to respect 
the precautionary principle. A country could not harm the recipients by using ODA for immoral 
reasons (for instance when used to expand the dominance of ‘affluent states’ over 
disadvantaged ones, or when used in the interests of multinationals or corrupt people). Donors 
could not have hidden agenda nor be using ODA for purposes ultimately harming the recipients 
because the latter would not support them. Having the right intentions is not enough to 
successfully assist and thus honour one’s duty of solidarity, but it is certainly one of the 
prerequisites to do no harm. Then, respect of the precautionary principle would lead ODA to 
only be delivered if it has a reasonable prospect of success. Respecting the HRBA would 
therefore cause no harm and show more efficacity in bringing the best positive and lasting 
conditions possible for human dignity worldwide. 
II. Criticisms 
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It is worth noting that some people do not support the human rights approach because it is 
supposedly based on a Western understanding of justice, and it is intolerant to judge other 
societies on whether they share such a particular conception of rights. For instance, David 
Miller asks whether human rights are not a mere reflection of the Western conception of ‘the 
good polity’ rather than a reflection of universal beliefs (Miller, 2004, p. 128). John Rawls 
grants that some human rights are rather instrumentally important, in the sense that they are 
needed in Western democracies (for instance the right to political participation) but can be 
neglected elsewhere. However, other human rights are fundamental for access to any 
conception of a good life worldwide. For this reason, John Rawls in the Law of Peoples accepts 
that some societies discard non-fundamental human rights, but he maintains that all societies 
must present minimum conditions of respect for human rights because fundamental rights are 
not negotiable (Rawls, 1993, pp. 57, 59, 61). Rawls stresses that states have the duty to assist 
peoples who lack the means to organise themselves as a liberal or well-ordered society14 
(Rawls, 1993, p. 63). Likewise, Erin Kelly puts emphasis on the duty to protect fundamental 
human rights, which, for her, is a matter of morality, not of culture. Such rights protect the 
fundamental interests and dignity of any person regardless of her country or culture, and it 
would be immoral not to respect them. In other words, the promotion of human rights results 
from mutual respect and concern for the fundamental interests of others worldwide. 
Recognising this cross-culturally shared concern for fundamental human rights enables 
effective joint deliberation and action between societies, and a shared commitment to the 
protection of human rights globally (Kelly, 2004, pp. 178-180). For this reason, states can at 
least all agree that fundamental human rights offer a strong moral reason for states to participate 
in a scheme of cooperation that will strengthen those rights. 
Nevertheless, the duty of solidarity can only be met when all people enjoy their RTD, which 
requires that all human rights – even the ‘instrumental’ ones – be secured for all. It would be a 
mistake to dismiss the duty of solidarity on the basis that it demands the promotion of human 
rights that cannot be imposed upon non-Western cultures. Martha Nussbaum points out that, 
considering the historical record of people worldwide fighting and dying for ideas of political 
 
14 A society whose ‘political institutions specify a just consultation hierarchy while [its] basic social 
institutions satisfy a conception of justice expressing an appropriate conception of the common good.’ It is 
‘peaceful and not expansionist; its legal system satisfies certain requisite conditions of legitimacy in the eyes of 
its own people; and, as a consequence of this, it honours basic human rights’ (Rawls, 1993, pp. 37, 44) 
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equality, democracy, human dignity, and toleration, it is very plausible that so-called Western 
notions are principles of global justice, despite the differences of history, tradition and beliefs 
between each person (Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 153–155). Besides, as argued before, the RTD is 
not about imposing a single conception of the good life. On the contrary, it is the means by 
which all people can protect their dignity and pursue their own purposes – so long as they do 
not infringe upon other people’s rights. Also, adopting a HRBA imposes the acknowledgment 
of the recipient communities’ culture – i.e. their beliefs, practices and forms of organisation. 
So, such approach should in fact lead methods of development cooperation to respect other 
cultures better than ever. Lastly, as admitted by the FAO, according to the contextualisation, 
the approach can show some flexibility ‘as human rights could be sensitive issues and require 
repackaging in some contexts.’ (FAO, 2017, p. 85 box 2) 
 
In the following section, I suggest a scheme of participation that would enable states to fulfil 
the RTD. However, before such scheme can be set up, mechanisms for transparency and 
accountability must be created. First and foremost because they are necessary to prevent aid to 
do harm, which must be the priority of development cooperation. Secondly, because the 
proposed scheme of participation requires proper accountability mechanisms and effective 
universal access to detailed information for participation to be genuine and effective (Alfarargi, 
2018, para. 68). 
III. A proposal for inclusive public participation 
Empowering the recipients to take an active role in the development process through 
inclusive public participation is the key to improve aid and fix its problems. Ensuring inclusive 
and participatory processes is where one should start to honour the duty of solidarity. Donors 
and local authorities need precise, relevant and sustainable objectives for their development 
policies and such objectives can only be determined with the target population. As stipulated 
by the participation principle, inclusive individual and collective participation should be 
accessible and encouraged among all relevant stakeholders throughout the whole development 
process. Firstly, populations should have a say in the formulating of development policies 
concerning them. There should be public consultations to gather people’s opinions and hear 
about their difficulties to make sure that development policies reflect development needs. The 
consultations must be democratic, because the voice of everyone concerned by the projects 
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must be taken seriously, including those usually silenced about the inequalities they suffer in 
their culture (Lakhonin, 2016, pp. 68, 75).  
Then, a way to involve the people further would be by means of open calls for projects to 
which ODA and other grants would be distributed. Allocating ODA only by means of grants 
supporting specific projects rather than with continual flows would ensure that it is specifically 
directed to promising solutions and specific purposes. The open calls should be open to anyone; 
individuals, collectives, NGOs, private organisations, public administrations, etc. In any case, 
the money from the grants should only be spent for the projects and not on other costs. This 
way, donors can be certain that their assistance will be efficiently used in a limited period of 
time for particular needs and it is less likely to face cases of misappropriation and misallocation. 
Besides, as advocated by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, donors should trust more the 
potential impacts of small projects because incremental progress can sometimes lead to a quiet 
revolution to improve accountability and reduce corruption (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, pp. 212, 
217). For instance, when political institutions are not there to put constraints on rulers to prevent 
them from deviating too much from the public interest, aid can support local projects that will 
eventually enable such institutions to ‘emanate from the bottom up’ (ibidem, 2011, p. 216). 
However, such project system with open calls must be designed in a way that it does not ‘reward 
those who are well connected and master the project language rather than those who are engaged 
in grassroots-supported social change’, as Peter Uvin might fear (Uvin, 2004, p. 174). Besides, 
it is important that the projects chosen through the open calls be widely supported by the local 
populations. For these reasons, there should be small-scale public consultations (where full 
information about the projects is provided for people to make informed decisions), so the extent 
of public support for the projects can be a selection criterion. Public disapproval must also come 
into consideration when donors choose the different projects in order to prevent that the needs 
and opinions of minorities be left aside. Other criteria should be taken into account per area, 
such as the purposes of the projects, their target population, their sustainability, their local-
based solutions, etc. 
Afterwards, there should be continual public participation to help monitor the 
implementations of policies and projects and to evaluate their outcomes in order to be certain 
that they are fulfilling their objectives. Finally, there could be additional public consultations 
to invite people to elaborate corrective actions when problems have occurred.  
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This would ensure that aid exclusively goes to projects likely to help targeted communities 
and would prevent selfish (or even corrupt) local governments dedicating aid flows according 
to the particular interests of certain people (for example the local elite, foreign governments, 
and corporations) who assure their continuing in power in return. Through such consultations, 
donors will know what works and is needed, accept responsibility for their financial supports, 
ask for consistent feedbacks, care about local conditions and learn about local reality directly 
from the people, rather than apply global blueprints. They will no longer ask themselves what 
ending global poverty requires of them, but will find out what a particular community needs 
(Easterly, 2006, pp. 6–11). Also, involving more people in the development process will relieve 
government officials who spend more than half their time responding to foreign donor 
requirements, writing reports, or meeting donors, instead of contributing to good governance 
and being at the disposal of their population (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 4). 
Such scheme of participation would naturally lead the way towards the respect of the equity 
and non-discrimination principles of the rights-based approach. Aid would be distributed in an 
equitable way since donors will have been informed about the needs of the people, including 
the most marginalised parts of the populations, and solutions will have been deployed 
accordingly to ensure the fair sharing of benefits and burdens. Since the participation and 
decision-making process would be inclusive and democratic, aid would never fail the principle 
of non-discrimination. 
The difficulty with public participation is not only to organise and finance consultations, it 
is also to reach and motivate a high number of people to take part to them. People in desperate 
search for basic goods and services to answer their elementary needs cannot afford to spend 
time on public consultations. A solution would be to attract people by providing them with food 
and water, and access to sanitation and healthcare at the consultation places. And the 
consultations should occur in many villages, so people do not have to cover too large distances 
to attend them and every person can be reached even in remote places. 
 
This scheme is quite idealistic for it requires from the donors to let go off their control over 
the projects on which ODA is spent. Current practices show they are not yet ready to choose 
that way of assisting. We could change again the way we measure ODA so that it only includes 
grants that were delivered in a way respecting the RTD. Then, states would have to make the 
necessary efforts to improve aid. However, this would require that the international community 
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agrees to follow the HRBA, which is currently not the case. Furthermore, states may not be 
motivated enough and may decide to give up on delivering ODA despite their commitments. 
As we saw with the problem of the financing gap, there is a critical lack of engagement from 
their part. The HRBA is promising, but it is clearly still facing many challenges.  
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Conclusion 
All human beings have the fundamental right to live with dignity in a world where they can 
fully enjoy all their rights. This makes them entitled to participate and benefit from the 
development process in order to be able to constantly improve their wellbeing. In other words, 
people have a human right to development. Everyone has the duty to respect others’ RTD. There 
are also moral agents who have the duty to aid people deprived of living conditions to enjoy 
their RTD. Several principles may come to use to appoint the duty to particular agents according 
to their level of responsibility. Since it matters particularly that duty bearers be capable of 
realising the duty, I have argued that the capacity principle should have the primacy over the 
other principles. Considering the important means necessary to realise the RTD globally, and 
‘affluent states’’ powerful status in the world order, the latter seem to be the most capable agents 
to assist deprived populations. This is states’ duty of international solidarity. We should expect 
all capable states to perform their duty to aid together by forming a collective agent whose 
development assistance is coordinated by a common international institution. Based on 
principles such as outcome responsibility, the benefit principle, or the historical taint principle, 
the international institution (for instance the OECD) must identify the fairest and smallest 
possible burden-sharing coalition made of its members to assist a given population. 
Over the past decades, states have engaged in development cooperation, but this does not 
ensure that they meet their duty of solidarity. Nowadays, the way development cooperation 
works is controversial. States offer too little aid compared to their capacity, and they use 
questionable methods, notably because development cooperation can be a matter of self-interest 
on the part of certain states who see their prosperity dependent on that of the others. Their self-
oriented political and economic reasons have often led states to put moral considerations in the 
background for the benefit of development policies ‘preoccupied with the growth of output of 
material products and marketable services’ rather than with human needs (Sengupta, 1999, para. 
48). As a result, methods of cooperation do not always serve the interests of the assisted 
populations and might even worsen their situation, which fails the duty of solidarity and goes 
against the duty to do no harm. This paper aimed to show that this could be solved if states were 
to acknowledge that they have a duty of international solidarity demanding more of them, and 
that for development cooperation to serve this duty, it should primarily be dedicated to fulfilling 
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the RTD for all human beings rather than serve other purposes. The moral imperative must be 
at the core of development methods. 
In the last chapter, I have suggested that the human rights-based approach (HRBA) to 
development offers such a guidance for development cooperation, for it prescribes to orientate 
all development methods according to human rights and their corresponding principles. Finally, 
I attempted to draft an ideal scheme of inclusive public participation, which I believe is crucial 
for all people to be empowered to take part to the development process. 
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